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ABSTRACT 
 Despite vast literature on American foreign policy and presidential decision-
making, little attention has been given to the problems associated with presidential 
transitions.  The American presidential transition period is accompanied by three 
limitations that threaten the effectiveness of presidential authority.  First, presidential 
authority is unclear in the ambiguity of the transition period.  Second, new 
administrations struggle to incorporate overlapping initiatives and personnel into new 
policies and priorities.   Third, inexperience can cripple a new administration in the first 
few months of a presidency.  These limitations are illustrated by an analysis of two 
transitional foreign policy crises: the Bay of Pigs crisis overlapping the Eisenhower and 
Kennedy administrations and the Somalia intervention overlapping the Bush and Clinton 
administrations.  This analysis demonstrates the importance of transitional limitations as 
independent variables which are magnified by other issues including groupthink, 
bureaucratic politics, and Congressional advocacy.  The Transitional Limitations Model 
is introduced to explain the role of transitional limitations and multiple intervening 
variables in causing American foreign policy miscalculations during the presidential 
transition period.      
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INTRODUCTION 
The American democratic system periodically allows for a rapid and dramatic 
turnover in executive leadership.  Within a 24 hour period, a completely different team is 
guiding the direction and implementation of American policy at home and abroad.  
Remarkably, this rapid turnover is not the result of a violent revolution, but instead is an 
established and peaceful institution of the American democratic system.  In the post-
World War II period alone, the United States has experienced 11 presidential transitions.  
Of these transitions, 7 represented a complete turnover in executive leadership from one 
political party to another.  The presidential transition period brings new personalities, 
procedures, policies, and priorities to the decision-making process.  As this thesis will 
discuss, the period can also result in dramatic foreign policy miscalculations at the hands 
of inexperienced administrations.   
 Despite these dramatic implications, the presidential transition period is neglected 
in the literature examining American foreign policy crises.  Only a handful of sources 
analyze the role of the transition period on American foreign policy.  These include 
Campbell & Steinberg‟s Difficult Transitions: Foreign Policy Troubles at the Outset of 
Presidential Power (2008) and Mosher, Clinton, & Lang‟s Presidential Transitions and 
Foreign Affairs (1987).  Many other sources address foreign policy crises that occurred 
during a presidential transition, but they overlook the obvious role of the transition period 
itself.  Instead, these sources focus on other causes including bureaucratic politics, 
psychological influences on decision-making, and the role of Congress.  These causes 
play an important role in transitional foreign policy crises, but their influence on 
presidential decision-making raises an important question that is not addressed by 
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existing analyses.  Why are these factors allowed to dominate presidential decision-
making?  This thesis will address that question within the context of the presidential 
transition period.  During the transitional foreign policy crises discussed, transitional 
limitations explain the dominating influence of non-presidential forces on foreign policy 
decision-making.   
 This thesis focuses on three limitations imposed by the presidential transition 
period: ambiguity, the holdover effect, and inexperience.  The transfer of power from one 
administration to the next temporarily restricts the power and effectiveness of the 
presidency.  Ambiguity stems directly from this transfer of power.  Between the 
presidential election and inauguration, a power vacuum occurs as neither the outgoing 
nor the incoming administrations are able to govern effectively.  The political mandate to 
govern is transferred 11 weeks before the official transfer of constitutional authority.  
Outgoing administrations must either defer decisions to the next administration or initiate 
policies that they will not be able to fully implement.   
The holdover effect also stems directly from the transfer of power.  The holdover 
effect refers to initiatives that overlap administrations.  Most policies, especially in the 
foreign policy realm, cannot be brought to a neat conclusion at the end of a presidential 
term.  Each new administration must decide how to respond to the policies and practices 
initiated by their predecessors.  Similarly, new administrations will often reappoint 
officials in sensitive posts from the previous administration.  The presence of holdover 
personnel has important consequences on the decision-making dynamics of the new team.     
The third transitional limitation is perhaps the most obvious.  Inexperience can 
cripple an administration during the first few months of a new presidency.  
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Administrations must learn how to deal with decisions at the presidential level.  Most 
modern presidents have had very little experience with foreign policy.  This experience is 
only gained with time in office.  Additionally, administrations are most often comprised 
of officials who have never worked together before.  This adds an additional challenge to 
the decision-making process, especially in a crisis situation when decisions must be made 
with very little time or information.    
 Together, these factors have a limiting impact on presidential decision-making 
that should be considered when examining transitional foreign policy crises.  These 
limitations create a situation of “policy uncertainty.”  For the purposes of this thesis, 
“policy uncertainty” refers to presidential indecision or inattention resulting in an absence 
of presidential leadership.  Policy uncertainty is especially crippling in foreign policy 
when presidential leadership is necessary to both determine and communicate American 
interests abroad.      
 To illustrate the limitations of the presidential transition period, this thesis will 
focus on presidential decision-making during two transitional foreign policy crises: the 
Bay of Pigs crisis which overlapped the administrations of Dwight D. Eisenhower and 
John F. Kennedy in 1960-61 and the Somalia intervention which overlapped the 
administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton in 1992-94.  The striking parallels 
between these two crises illustrate the dangers of the presidential transition period.  In 
each case, effective presidential decision-making was hindered by transitional limitations.  
The resulting policy uncertainty (presidential indecision or inattention) allowed other 
forces to dominate foreign policy decisions.  In each case, the absence of presidential 
leadership resulted in a dramatic miscalculation with tragic consequences.  These striking 
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parallels in crises thirty years apart demonstrate the prominence of transitional problems 
in the American democratic system.   
Analysis of these cases also reveals that the causes prominent in existing literature 
are not as important to transitional foreign policy miscalculations as the limitations 
stemming from the presidential transition period.  In this thesis, the relationship between 
transitional limitations and foreign policy miscalculations is illustrated by what I will 
refer to as the Transitional Limitations Model.  The model relies on several accepted 
terms in political science research: independent variable, dependent variable, and 
intervening variable.  An independent variable is a phenomenon which causes another 
phenomenon to occur.  The dependent variable is the phenomenon that is caused by the 
presence of an independent variable (Johnson & Joslyn, 1995, p. 45).  As Johnson and 
Joslyn explain, this two-factor relationship is not enough to examine most political 
science situations.  In Political Science Research Methods (1995), they define intervening 
variables as a way to complete this analysis, “Intervening variables come between an 
independent and dependent variable and help explain the process by which one influences 
the other” (Johnston & Joslyn, 1995, p. 46).  Using this terminology, the Transitional 
Limitations Model identifies transitional limitations as the independent variable which 
leads to the dependent variable of foreign policy miscalculation.  This contrasts existing 
analyses which identifies factors including bureaucratic politics, groupthink, and the role 
of Congress as independent variables leading to the policy miscalculation.  Using the 
Transitional Limitations Model, this thesis will argue that these analyses are incomplete 
because they fail to address the crucial role of the presidential transition period in 
deflecting presidential attention from American foreign policy.  In a more complete 
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analysis, bureaucratic politics, Congressional advocacy, and psychological decision-
making perspectives function as intervening variables which magnify the policy 
uncertainty generated by the presidential transition period.    
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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS 
Ronald Reagan described the period as, “nothing less than a miracle,” while 
Nikita Khurschev decried the “damn elections” that impeded normal diplomatic functions 
(Reagan and Khruschev quoted in Mosher, Clinton, & Lang, 1987, p. 28).  Regardless of 
your perspective, the 11 weeks between presidential elections and inaugurations has a 
profound impact on American foreign policy.  During this period, a power vacuum often 
occurs: the newly elected administration lacks constitutional authority while the outgoing 
administration lacks the political will to govern effectively.  Foreign governments sense 
the futility in dealing with a „lame duck administration,‟ but it is difficult for the 
incoming administration to fill this void without the constitutional authority to govern.  
Incoming administrations are also careful to avoid the appearance of dual heads of state.  
During interparty transitions, which are often marked by significant policy differences 
between the outgoing and incoming administrations, this power vacuum is even more 
prominent.   
 Foreign policy decisions are especially vulnerable to the dangers of the transition 
period.  These decisions are elevated to the world stage, and require delicate interactions 
with both allies and adversaries.  Shortly after taking office, President John F. Kennedy 
noted the heightened danger of foreign policy decisions.  “Domestic policy can only 
defeat us,” he said, “foreign policy can kill us” (Mosher et al., 1987, p. 13).  Foreign 
policy decisions are also accompanied by a greater sense of urgency.  While domestic 
affairs issues can usually be deferred until after the transition period has passed, decisions 
in the foreign policy realm generally require an immediate and strategically coordinated 
response.  
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Despite the incoherence and inexperience that marks the transition period, the 
American government must continue to function.  Strategies must be planned and 
implemented, diplomatic maneuvers must continue smoothly, and international crises 
must be averted.  The transfer of power from one administration to the next cannot signal 
a waning of American power and influence.  Contrasting this need for consistency is the 
promise that each presidential campaign makes of new initiatives and an improved 
outlook on world affairs.  Each new administration must reconcile these expectations 
with the realities of the office and the world situation.  This interplay between 
expectation and reality comes to the forefront when new administrations must implement 
policies and initiatives put in place by the previous administration.  In the months 
following inauguration, when the expectations for change are high, these administrations 
are forced to confront the legacy of their predecessor.   
This thesis will examine the planning and implementation of responses to 
international crises that overlap administrations during the transition period.  These 
overlap policies not only reveal the danger of the transition period, but also the limits of 
presidential power in the American democratic system.  The new administration often 
lacks the experience and authority to effectively manipulate the levers of power available 
to the presidency.  During these transitional crises, a time when presidential power is 
most needed, a leadership vacuum allows other forces to dominate presidential decision 
making.  To fully understand the implications of the presidential transition period, I will 
start with an overview of foreign policy during presidential transitions.  I will look at the 
foundations of presidential power within the contexts of American democracy and 
international crises.  Then, I will examine how these foundations are threatened by the 
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transition period.  Finally, I will introduce a model for examining policy mismanagement 
within the context of the transition period. 
Presidential Power in the Context of American Democracy 
Two hundred and forty years after the signing of the Declaration of Independence, 
the American democratic system has evolved from a great experiment to a thriving, 
though imperfect, political system.  Efforts to duplicate this system can be found around 
the world, with varying degrees of success.  In 1992, political economist Francis 
Fukuyama went so far as to suggest that liberal democracy had achieved „universal 
validity‟ on the world stage (Fukuyama, 1992).  However, questions remain about the 
effectiveness of democracies in the foreign policy realm.  These questions were first 
raised in the earliest years of American democracy.  In 1841, Alexis de Tocqueville 
outlined these questions and concluded that democracy was a „decidedly inferior‟ form of 
government in the field of foreign affairs.  He argued that democracies lacked the 
centralization, determination, and discernment necessary for prudent and effective 
foreign policy.  de Tocqueville wrote,  
“…a democracy is unable to regulate the details of an important undertaking, to 
persevere in a design, and to work out its execution in the presence of serious 
obstacles.  It cannot combine its measures with secrecy, and will not await their 
consequences with patience.” (de Tocqueville, 2007, p. 191) 
 
Early statesmen resolved this issue with an isolationist foreign policy (Mastanduno, 
1994).  However, disengagement is no longer feasible in today‟s interconnected world 
where America is looked to as a global leader.   
America‟s rise as a global superpower discredits de Tocqueville‟s claim that 
democracy and effective foreign policy are incompatible.  Scholar Kenneth Waltz 
concluded instead that, “American institutions facilitate rather than discourage the quick 
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identification of problems, the pragmatic quest for solutions, the ready confrontation of 
dangers, the willing expenditure of energies, and the open criticism of policies” (Waltz, 
1967, p. 307).  Michael Mastanduno supports this claim.  He argued that the American 
democratic system is more an asset than a burden to the foreign policy making process.  
Mastanduno highlights three ways that the democratic system brings increased legitimacy 
and duration to American foreign policy.  First, he argues that the inherent tension 
between Congress and the Executive can be an effective bargaining tool, allowing the 
Executive to appear reasonable and moderate to foreign governments.  He adds that the 
need for public support lends legitimacy to foreign policy and can increase the duration 
of international commitments.  Finally, Mastanduno argues that the openness of 
American democracy adds legitimacy because foreign leaders can actively track 
adherence to international commitments (Mastanduno, 1994, p. 261). 
 Waltz and Mastanduno agree that strong presidential leadership is a necessary 
component of effective democratic foreign policy.  Waltz noted that periods of 
governmental effectiveness correspond directly with the administrations of bold and 
strong presidents (Waltz, 1967, p. 47).  Mastanduno also argued that the legitimacy and 
duration of American foreign policy is dependent on effective presidential leadership.  He 
wrote, “It may require time, effort, and the expense of political capital, but a determined 
President with a sense of foreign policy purpose can manage the constraints of the 
domestic political system” (Mastanduno, 1994, p. 261).  As Waltz and Mastanduno 
demonstrate, presidential leadership can fill the gap of centralized decision making, 
determination, and discernment that de Tocqueville observed. 
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Presidential Power in the Context of International Crises 
The need for presidential leadership in foreign affairs is most prominent during 
international crises.  Karl W. Deutsch (1982) identified four characteristics of 
international crises that explain the need for presidential leadership.  First, the situation 
must represent a major turning point with multiple divergent outcomes possible.  Next, 
the situation must require a decision.  Third, the situation must involve primary national 
interests for at least one participant.  Finally, the situation is acute rather than chronic, 
with a short time period to make a decision (Deutsch, 1982, p. 16).  Deutsch‟s 
characteristics illustrate the need for centralized decision making, discernment, and 
demonstrated resolve in international crises.  In the presence of a defined threat, when a 
rapid decision is necessary, strong presidential leadership is required to gather adequate 
information and determine the direction of an American response.  No other entity in the 
American democratic system is equipped to fill this role.     
During international crises, information about a foreign government‟s capabilities 
and intentions is crucial to the decision making process.  However, the American 
democratic system presents multiple sources of information ranging from Congressional 
hearings to media reports to public opinion.  In his 2001 book, Democracy and Coercive 
Diplomacy, Kenneth Schultz writes that the effort to communicate resolve is central to 
international crises (Schultz, 2001, p. 4).  A government‟s decision to concede or escalate 
tensions is based on estimation.  Decision makers must evaluate which course best 
advances their national interest.  Rational governments will only wage war with a 
reasonable expectation of success.  Consequently, war can be avoided if a government is 
11 
 
able to threaten consequences that are sufficiently burdensome and credible to deter 
hostility.   
Schultz further argues that asymmetric information is the basis for international 
conflict.  Asymmetric information is the situation that arises when, “states have 
information about their willingness and ability to wage war that other states cannot 
observe” (Schultz, 2001, p. 4).  The risk of asymmetric information is exacerbated when 
multiple sources of information are present, as in a democratic system.  Uncertainty 
results when foreign governments are unable to determine a rival‟s capabilities and 
interests.  The uncertainty of asymmetric information escalates the tension and danger of 
an international crisis.  Decision makers are only able to advance their national interest 
by effectively demonstrating resolve and limiting the effect of asymmetric information.  
Schultz continues that, “Overcoming asymmetric information requires that actors find 
ways to reveal their resolve in a credible manner, given a strategic environment that 
encourages deception” (Schultz, 2001, p. 5).  In the American democratic system, 
presidential leadership is necessary to overcome asymmetric information and present a 
unified front to foreign governments and domestic constituents.  However, as this thesis 
seeks to demonstrate, presidential leadership is severely limited by the incoherence of the 
presidential transition period. 
Defining the Transition Period 
The presidential transition period has not always been the frenetic blur of 
statements, appointments, and initiatives that we observe today.  Prior to World War I, 
the transition period featured at most a series of informal meetings with trusted advisors 
(Campbell & Steinberg, 2008).  When Herbert Hoover was elected in 1928, he took full 
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advantage of the four month period between the November election and his inaugural on 
March 4
th
.  His transition included a two-month goodwill tour to Latin America and a 
month-long fishing trip in Florida (Burke, 2000).  Four years later and in the midst of a 
severe economic crisis, the long transition period was more burden than pleasure for 
Franklin Roosevelt as he watched the country‟s banking system collapse before he took 
office in March (Neustadt, 1990).  The passage of the Twentieth Amendment in 1933 
moved the inauguration from March 4 to January 20 and shortened the transition period 
by half (Burke, 2000). 
By 1960, awareness had grown of the vulnerability that the country faced during 
the transition period.  Increased transition costs accompanied the increased awareness.  
Daily intelligence briefings for presidential candidates were arranged after the 
nominating convention (Mosher et al., 1987, p. 59).  Task forces were formed to make 
recommendations on the issues and challenges facing the new administration.  After the 
election, representatives of the incoming administration were even placed on government 
payroll to work side by side with their outgoing counterparts (Mosher et al., 1987, p. 
158).  Between the Truman/Eisenhower transition and the Eisenhower/Kennedy 
transition, total transition costs jumped from $385,000 to $1.3 million (Mosher, 1985).  
Despite the increased planning, the Eisenhower/Kennedy transition witnessed one of the 
clearest examples of transitional incoherency during the Bay of Pigs crisis.  This crisis 
will be discussed in more detail later.  After this experience, President Kennedy 
appointed the Commission on Campaign Costs which recommended increased support 
for candidates during the campaign and transition period.  The Presidential Transition Act 
of 1963 allocated government funds to the transition process and set aside office space 
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and other resources for the transition teams (Mosher, 1985, p. 158).  Proponents of the 
Act argued that transitional challenges and expenses were a public, not a partisan issue.   
Legislation enacted in response to the Watergate scandal also smoothed the 
transition process.  Prior to 1978, outgoing presidents could destroy or keep any 
documents, leaving nothing to brief the incoming administration.  Mosher et. al (1987) 
describe the absence of documentation for the nation‟s highest office, 
“It has also meant that every new president and his staff find that the White House  
„cupboards are bare‟ – bare of the back-up records on foreign and national 
security affairs as well as on other matters.  One former member of the national 
security staff remarked, with some exaggeration, that the only paper left for the 
newcomers was toilet paper.” 
(Mosher et al., 1987, p. 75) 
 
In 1978, Congress passed the Presidential Records Act, mandating that presidential 
records become government property immediately following the end of an 
administration.  This gave incoming administrations valuable background information 
and procedural guides to follow during the first year in office.  Since 1978, very little 
legislation has been enacted to smooth the transition process.  Despite the ever-increasing 
costs and personnel associated with the period, the policies and practices remain non-
binding.   
Presidential Power in the Context of the Transition Period 
The transfer of power from one administration to the next weakens the strength 
and effectiveness of presidential power.  In Presidential Power and the Modern 
Presidents, Neustadt equates presidential power with the power to persuade (p. 28).  He 
argues that effective presidential authority cannot exist in the absence of persuasion.  
Neustadt bases effective presidential authority on the presence of five factors (p. 18).  
First, the president‟s involvement must be unambiguous.  There should be no doubt that 
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the orders come directly from the president and express his personal decision.  Second, 
the president‟s meaning must be unambiguous.  All of those involved should understand 
precisely what the president hopes to achieve.  Third, appropriate publicity should be 
given to the presidential directive.  Neustadt explains, 
“Even when there is no need for ambiguity, no possibility of imprecision, no real 
discretionary leeway, and nothing to misunderstand, compliance may depend not 
only on the respondent‟s awareness of what he is to do but also on the awareness 
of others that he has been told to do it.”  (Neustadt, 1990, p. 20)    
 
Fourth, those receiving presidential orders should possess all requisite knowledge and the 
resources necessary to successfully implement the directive.  Finally, Neustadt argues 
that presidential effectiveness rests on the knowledge of all involved that the president 
has the authority to make this request.    
Neustadt‟s analysis highlights the danger of the transition period because each of 
these factors is threatened by the incoherence of the period and by the inexperience of 
new administrations.  Neustadt‟s factors require clear authority, experience, and adequate 
command of resources.  However, the limitations of the transition period threaten these 
requirements for presidential authority and challenge presidential effectiveness. 
Transitional Limitations on Presidential Power: Ambiguity 
 Article II, Section I of the United States Constitution notes that, “The Executive 
power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”  Despite this clear 
explanation of authority, America periodically experiences a lapse in executive 
leadership.  During the 11 weeks between presidential elections and inaugurations, a 
power vacuum occurs: the newly elected administration lacks constitutional authority 
while the outgoing administration lacks the political will to govern effectively.  In the 
final year of a presidential term, influence slowly wanes as domestic and international 
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focus shifts to the campaign.  Foreign governments sense the futility in dealing with a 
„lame duck administration.‟  Secretary of State Dean Acheson described his experience at 
a NATO Council meeting in 1952 after Eisenhower‟s election, 
 “Our (foreign colleagues) treated us with the gentle and affectionate solicitude 
that one might show to the dying, but asked neither help nor advice nor 
commitment for a world we would not share with them.  For this they were 
waiting for our successors.” 
 (Acheson quoted in Mosher, 1985, p. 472).   
 
Despite the „lame duck‟ effect, it is difficult for incoming administrations to fill this void 
without the constitutional authority to govern.  Incoming administrations are also careful 
to avoid the appearance of dual heads of state.  This power vacuum is most prominent in 
interparty transitions, which are often marked by significant policy differences between 
the outgoing and incoming administrations.  In the absence of the Cold War threat, 
significant foreign policy differences have emerged between the two parties, which add 
to the incoherence of presidential transitions. 
 Another concern during the transition period is that other nations will take 
advantage of this period of incoherence and relative weakness.  Maurice Stans, director 
of the budget during the Eisenhower administration warned, “For an enemy, January 20 
would be the ideal date for an attack on the United States,” (Stans quoted in Mosher et 
al., 1987, p. 14).  This awareness of the vulnerability that the country faced during the 
transition period was confirmed in 1980 when the Soviet Union began offensive 
measures against Poland immediately following Reagan‟s election (Campbell & 
Steinberg, 2008, p. 24).   
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Transitional Limitations on Presidential Power: Inexperience 
The dangers of transition do not end on Inauguration Day.  In fact, the first few 
months of a presidency can be even more treacherous until the new administration gains 
presidential experience.  Most modern presidents have little experience in foreign affairs 
prior to assuming the presidency and are ill-equipped to respond to world events within 
the first months of the administration.  President Kennedy described this problem,  
“If someone comes in to tell me this or that about the minimum wage bill I have 
no hesitation in overruling them.  But you always assume that the military and 
intelligence people have some secret not available to ordinary mortals.”  
(Kennedy quoted in Campbell & Steinberg, 2008, p. 27)   
 
This hesitation is only improved with foreign policy experience, something post-WWII 
presidents have not had until the first few years of their terms.   
Inexperience is amplified when a long period of time has elapsed since a political 
party last controlled the White House.  President Bill Clinton experienced this in 1992 
when he became the first Democratic president in twelve years.  The time lapse added to 
the challenge of finding qualified people to fill administration slots, especially in foreign 
policy.  Clinton described the challenge, 
“… the fact that so many sub-cabinet positions had not been finalized had more to  
do with the fact that the Democrats had been out of power for twelve years.  We 
had to replace a lot of people.” (Clinton quoted in Campbell & Steinberg, 2008, p. 
11) 
 
The challenge of finding qualified people for administration posts has increased 
exponentially in recent years.  Campbell and Steinberg explain that the increased 
challenge is due in part to the creation of new government departments, 
“…since 2000, the last election in which party control of the White House 
changed hands, a whole new set of agencies and their associate leadership 
positions have been created, most notably the Department of Homeland Security, 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (and the reformed intelligence 
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community bureaucracy), and the Homeland Security Council.” (Campbell & 
Steinberg, 2008, p. 31) 
 
After an interparty transition such as Bush/Obama in 2009, each of these newly-created 
agencies are led by someone with little or no direct experience with the agency.  A group 
learning process is created at both the departmental and presidential level.  Compared to 
other democracies, the United States has a much larger percentage of administration posts 
that are filled by political appointment.  Even after the agency leadership and Cabinet 
level positions are filled, second and third tier positions remain unfilled during the 
extensive vetting and approval process (Campbell & Steinberg, 2008).   
 During the transition period, policy creation and implementation are both 
significantly hindered by the inexperience of the new administration.  The creation of 
effective, well-thought policy is very difficult for a new administration.  In any 
presidency, campaign promises, platforms, and expectations must be reconciled with the 
realities of the office.  Henry Kissinger, National Security Advisor and Secretary of State 
for President Nixon cautioned that,  
 “…the pledges of each new Administration are like leaves on a turbulent sea.  No  
President-Elect or his advisors can possibly know upon what shore they may 
finally be washed by storm of deadlines, ambiguous information, complex 
choices, and manifold pressures which descends upon all leaders of a great 
nation,” (Kissinger quoted in  Campbell & Steinberg, 2008, p. 42). 
 
This inexperience severely limits presidential effectiveness during the first year of a new 
administration.   
Transitional Limitations on Presidential Power: Holdover Effect 
 In addition to the limiting effects of ambiguity and inexperience, new 
administrations face another challenge during their first months in office.  They must also 
deal with initiatives and personnel that carry over from the previous administration.  Most 
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presidential policies and initiatives, especially in the foreign policy realm, do not come to 
a neat conclusion at the end of a presidential term.  Dean Rusk, Secretary of State for the 
Kennedy administration, remarked on this trend: 
“We pass our problems on to each other.  During the Berlin Crisis of 1961-62, a 
reporter asked me what my hopes were with regard to the Berlin Crisis.  I said, „I 
hope to be able to pass it along to my successor.‟” (Rusk quoted in Mosher et al., 
1987, p. 155)  
 
Each new administration must decide how to manage the work they inherit from their 
predecessors.  In many cases, the policies of previous administrations are not compatible 
with the priorities of the new administration.  The policy may also contradict positions 
and commitments advanced during the presidential campaign.  As new administrations 
quickly discover, presidents report to a much broader constituency than presidential 
candidates.  Campbell and Steinberg explain that, “Other countries‟ views figure little 
during the campaign (since they don‟t vote), but take on much great significance when 
the new administration turns to them for support on national security priorities” 
(Campbell & Steinberg, 2008, p. 47).  Despite this incompatibility, holdover policies are 
often too far entrenched to abandon without serious consequences and the new 
administration can be left with impossible choices.      
 Holdover personnel can also present challenges to the new administration.  
Administration officials in sensitive positions are often reappointed by the new 
administration to protect national security interests.  During the Eisenhower/Kennedy 
administration, Kennedy reappointed CIA director Allen Dulles, who would play a major 
role in the Bay of Pigs debacle.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell 
experienced the Bush/Clinton transition first-hand when his term extended into the first 
year of Clinton‟s presidency.  More recently, President Obama reappointed Robert Gates 
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as Secretary of Defense to ensure continuity for ongoing military operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  Holdover personnel bring valuable skills and experience, but they can also 
present challenges for the decision-making dynamics of the new team.  Officials who are 
accustomed to the practices of the previous administration must adapt to new policies and 
procedures.  These dynamics can also limit critical analysis during the decision-making 
process if loyalties to the previous administration‟s policies shift these officials from 
analysts to advocates. 
This thesis‟s focus on transitional limitations should not be interpreted as an 
argument against the American democratic system.  Transitional limitations are the 
unavoidable cost of the democratic process.  However, this cost is accompanied by the 
benefits of legitimacy, flexibility, and new ideas.  The case studies in this thesis 
demonstrate not only the weaknesses of American democracy, but also the strengths.  
Transitional crises present invaluable and irreplaceable lessons for new administrations.  
The flexibility of the American democratic system provided both the Kennedy and 
Clinton administrations with the opportunity to learn from their early mistakes.  
Additionally, the inherent accountability of a democratic system gives each 
administration added incentive to pursue those opportunities.   
Reevaluating the Transition Period 
As these challenges suggest, it is insufficient to only consider the 11 weeks 
between the election and inaugural when examining the hazards of the transition period.  
In fact, the first few months of a new administration can be even more treacherous.  
President Eisenhower explained this danger when he cautioned that, 
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“… an emergency, arising at home or abroad during the first twenty-four hours  
after a new President takes his oath of office would demand decisions and actions 
which, by reason of the unfamiliarity of new officials with their duties and 
authority, might result in bewilderment and lack of intelligent reaction, with 
resultant damage to the United States.” (Eisenhower quoted in Campbell & 
Steinberg, 2008, p. 26) 
 
As Eisenhower observed, the first year of any administration includes a significant 
learning curve which limits the effectiveness and leadership of the office.   
In The President’s Agenda (1999), Paul C. Light examines the counteracting 
trends that can be observed over a presidential term.  Light quotes a Nixon aide who 
explained,  
“The more we seemed to learn about the domestic system, the less we could do.  
We had our best shot at the start of the term but didn‟t have the opportunity to 
cash in.  By the time we had the organization, the opportunity was closed.” (p. 36)    
 
Light identifies these trends as the cycle of decreasing influence and the cycle of 
increasing effectiveness.  The cycle of decreasing influence is based on political capital, 
time, and energy.  Starting in the first months of the campaign, new administrations 
usually experience a drop in both public approval ratings and support in Congress.  Light 
also observes that every administration in the last 50 years has experienced a loss in party 
House seats in the midterm Congressional election (Light, 1999, p. 36).  These factors 
temper the improvements brought by the cycle of increasing effectiveness.  The President 
and his staff develop sources of information and analysis.  Lessons are learned from early 
mistakes.  More effective decision-making processes are put in place as the new 
administration learns to work with themselves and within the Washington bureaucracy.  
Light describes the phenomenon, 
“Regardless of the President‟s initial expertise and information, the first year of 
the first term is characterized by a surprising level of confusion.  As the President 
and his staff settle the chaos, the opportunities disappear.  By the third and fourth 
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years, the President and the staff are fully trained for domestic choice, but the 
agenda must be restricted.”  
 (Light, 1999, p. 38) 
 
Light applies this phenomenon to the domestic agenda of presidents, but the phenomenon 
is even more applicable in the foreign policy realm.   
Richard Neustadt also warned of the inexperience and incoherency of the 
transition period.  He argued that it was insufficient to consider only the 11 weeks 
between election and inaugural.  Instead, he expanded the definition of the transition 
period to include the early months of the administration.  Depending on the effectiveness 
of the new administration and the events surrounding the transition period, varying 
amounts of time are required to work through the incoherence and ineffectiveness of the 
transition period.  In most cases, these effects can be observed well into the first year of a 
new administration.  A new presidency faces enormous pressure to act quickly and 
decisively on a broad range of issues.  Each new administration represents a fresh start in 
American politics and the expectation for rapid improvement is encouraged by campaign 
rhetoric promising change.  These high expectations are focused on the first hundred days 
of the new administration, mirrored after Roosevelt‟s „Hundred Days‟ which launched 
the nation‟s recovery from the Great Depression with a series of broad and ambitious 
presidential initiatives (Alter, 2006).  Neustadt warns that this mentality is dangerous 
because it leads to overconfidence and miscalculation in new administrations.  Instead, he 
argues that the transition period must be viewed as a learning process that is both 
inevitable and legitimate (Neustadt, 1990, p. 232).  Neustadt described his vision, 
“Someday a President-Elect might feel that he could say to newsmen (and 
himself), „there won‟t be any „Hundred Days,‟ I can‟t know how I really want to 
organize my White House, ask me again next year; we don‟t yet understand how 
22 
 
campaign pledges fit events and trends as yet unknown to us.  That‟s what four 
years are for.”  
(Neustadt, 1990, p. 232) 
 
Rather than focusing on what can be accomplished in the first „Hundred Days,‟ Neustadt 
suggests that new administrations and observers focus on the lessons that can be learned 
from the challenges of the transition period.  Multiple examples of policy miscalculations 
during the transition period demonstrate the need for increased awareness of the 
limitations presented by this foundation of the American democratic system.   
Overview of Transitional Limitations Model 
The transitional limitations of ambiguity, inexperience, and the holdover effect 
demonstrate the increased vulnerability of new administrations, especially during 
international crises.  During these crises, other forces can become more influential in the 
absence of presidential initiative and leadership.  Existing analyses of transitional foreign 
policy crises examine the influence of these forces, but they fail to account for the critical 
role of the transition period in allowing these forces to dominate presidential decision-
making.  Rather than presenting these forces as the primary cause of the policy 
miscalculation, these forces must be considered in the context of the presidential 
transition.  Transitional limitations result in a dynamic of policy uncertainty (presidential 
indecision or inattention) in which American objective are unclear and policy drifts 
without the guidance of presidential leadership.  Within this dynamic, other forces fill the 
void of presidential leadership, resulting in miscalculation.   The following model 
illustrates this relationship: 
Transitional Limitations          X                Miscalculation 
Independent Variable      Intervening Variable                Dependent Variable 
 
23 
 
In this relationship, transitional limitations allow X forces to replace presidential 
leadership and cause miscalculations.  This model will be used to offer a more complete 
explanation of the transitional crises discussed in this paper.   
Overview of Case Studies 
In the following chapters, I will examine the American response to two 
international crises that overlapped presidential administrations: the Bay of Pigs crisis 
during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations and the Somalia intervention during 
the Bush and Clinton administrations.  In each of these cases, policy miscalculation at the 
presidential level resulted in American casualties and the public failure of a major 
military operation.  In both instances, presidential effectiveness in both the outgoing and 
incoming administrations was limited by the transition period.  Ambiguity, inexperience, 
and the holdover effect prevented adequate analysis and attention to the American 
response.  In the following sections, I will examine the role of transitional limitations in 
each miscalculation.  I will then discuss how the Transitional Limitations Model 
discussed above can fill in the gaps of existing analyses.  The striking similarities 
between these two crises serve as a warning to new administrations to proceed cautiously 
when evaluating and implementing overlap policies from the previous administration. 
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THE BAY OF PIGS CRISIS, 1960-1961 
 Within the first few months of President Kennedy‟s inauguration, his 
administration experienced a foreign policy crisis that Pierre Salinger recalled as “the 
greatest disaster of the Kennedy administration,” (Salinger, 1966, p. 100) and that Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. described as “a horribly expensive lesson” (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 297).  
The Kennedy administration inherited an overlap policy from Eisenhower which called 
for an invasion of Cuba and subsequent overthrow of Fidel Castro.  Existing analyses 
point to several factors at work during the crisis.  These factors include groupthink, Irving 
Janis‟s theory that members of a cohesive group can unconsciously merge their 
arguments to a set of shared beliefs and norms, and bureaucratic politics, the study of 
how the inner workings of bureaucracies impact both the creation and implementation of 
foreign policy.  What is lacking from these analyses is the role of the transition period in 
allowing these forces to dominate presidential decision-making.  During the Bay of Pigs 
crisis, the ambiguity of the presidential transition period allowed a major initiative to gain 
momentum without adequate oversight.  Policy uncertainty was magnified by Kennedy‟s 
inexperienced administration which was unable to reverse the momentum despite strong 
reservations about the plan.  The botched invasion attempt was launched only months 
after Kennedy assumed office and his administration was neither prepared nor equipped 
to manage the resulting crisis.   
 In the following sections, I will give a brief overview of the crisis.  I will then 
discuss the transitional limitations at work during the presidential transition period.  
Finally, I will look at how this framework relates to existing analyses of the crisis, 
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focusing on the theories of groupthink and bureaucratic politics.  This relationship will be 
explained using the Transitional Limitations Model established in the previous chapter. 
Bay of Pigs Crisis Overview 
 By the time President Kennedy assumed office, the small island nation of Cuba 
had come to play a major role in the escalating tensions between the United States and 
the Soviet Union.  In 1958, Fidel Castro overthrew the dictator Fulgencio Batista and 
gained control of Cuba (Freedman, 2000).  Castro‟s allegiances were unclear at the time 
of the Cuban Revolution.  However, between 1958 and 1961, Castro‟s sympathies moved 
closer to the Communist Soviet Union while his policies and rhetoric became 
increasingly anti-American (Freedman, 2000, p. 124).  Policy makers feared the 
repercussions of allowing the Soviet sphere of influence to extend so close to American 
soil and searched for a way to remove Castro from power.  In January of 1960, President 
Eisenhower agreed with a CIA assessment that Castro must be overthrown.  Two months 
later, Operation Pluto was launched (Freedman, 2000, p. 125).  CIA operatives planned to 
secretly train a brigade of Cuban exiles to overthrow Castro with guerilla maneuvers 
(Freedman, 2000, p. 126).  Fearing that guerilla maneuvers may not be enough to 
overcome Castro‟s forces, plans for a surprise invasion were later added.  The operation 
also utilized the Cuban Revolutionary Council, a group of exiled Cuban leaders in the 
United States.  The plan called for the Council to establish a provisional government in 
Cuba after Castro‟s overthrow (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 238).  Ominously, on April 1, 1961, 
the code name for the operation changed from “Crosspatch” to “Bumpy Road” 
(Freedman, 2000, p. 139).  President Kennedy gave his final approval for “Bumpy Road” 
in early April. 
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 On the morning of April 14, air strikes were launched against Cuba in an attempt 
to weaken Castro‟s forces prior to the invasion.  The first air strike inflicted little damage.  
Presidential advisor Arthur Schlesinger (1965) later reported that only five Cuban aircraft 
were destroyed.  The air strikes also removed the element of surprise.  After learning of 
the air strike, Castro ordered his troops to arrest any opposition forces in Havana.  
Following the air strike, Adlai Stevenson, the permanent U.S. representative to the United 
Nations, went before the UN General Assembly and denied any U.S. involvement in the 
air strikes (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 271).  After learning that he had been misled by the 
administration, Stevenson expressed his strong displeasure in a phone call to President 
Kennedy.  Kennedy responded by cancelling the second round of air strikes, against the 
advice of the CIA (Pious, 2008, p. 30).   
The land invasion was launched two days later in the early morning hours of April 
17.  At every stage, the invasion was plagued by poor planning and misinformation.  
Richard Neustadt described the events as, “a classic demonstration of Murphy‟s Law: If 
anything can go wrong… it did” (Neustadt, 1990, p. 246).  The brigade was immediately 
met by Castro‟s forces that were on alert after the failed air strikes and the brigade 
suffered heavy losses.  Inexplicably, most of the communications equipment and all of 
the ammunition reserve was carried in one ship.  That ship sank early in the operation, 
leaving the brigade with no communication and insufficient ammunition (Schlesinger, 
1965, p. 274).  Late in the operation, President Kennedy finally agreed to provide limited 
air cover to anti-Cuban B-26 flights over the Bay of Pigs.  However, a time zone mix-up 
led the B-26s to arrive an hour before their jet covers.  Four American volunteer pilots 
were killed when their undefended aircraft was downed by Cuban forces (Schlesinger, 
27 
 
1965, p. 278).  At the end of the day, over 100 brigade members were killed and nearly 
1,200 were taken prisoner by Castro‟s supposedly inferior forces (Pious, 2008, p. 31).  
The failure had both immediate and long-term implications.  Despite a temporary 
surge in domestic support, the crisis raised doubts about Kennedy‟s leadership among 
colleagues and foreign governments.  It is impossible to predict whether the invasion plan 
would have been more successful without the challenges added by the transition period.  
However, limiting forces at work during the transition ensured the policy‟s failure.  In the 
following sections, I will look at how presidential decision-making during the crisis was 
dominated by three transitional limitations: ambiguity, the holdover effect, and 
inexperience. 
Transitional Limitations: Ambiguity 
   From the earliest stages of the plan‟s development, critical analysis was limited 
by the ambiguity surrounding the transfer of power from one president to the next.  As 
explained earlier, the transition period creates a void in presidential leadership.  Influence 
slowly wanes in the final year of a presidential term as domestic and international focus 
shifts to the campaign.  Foreign governments and domestic constituents are reluctant to 
deal with a „lame duck‟ administration.  Transitional ambiguity also manifests itself as 
outgoing administrations defer difficult questions to their predecessors.  As discussed 
earlier, plans for the Cuban invasion emerged during the final year of Eisenhower‟s 
presidency and developed during the subsequent campaign and transition period.  
Eisenhower did not see Cuba as a national priority.  While he was willing to allow the 
CIA to proceed with preliminary planning, he neither encouraged nor endorsed the idea 
(Etheredge, 1985, p. 3).  His advisors deferred intense analysis to the incoming Kennedy 
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administration.  Consequently, neither administration assumed complete ownership of the 
operation.  Schlesinger explained: 
 “In the next weeks, government floated as in a void.  Neither the outgoing nor the  
incoming administration wanted to make fundamental decisions, and most matters 
continued to move along existing tracks.”  (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 233) 
 
The decision to rely on conventional military forces rather than guerilla forces was made 
without Eisenhower‟s knowledge or consent (Sorensen, 1965, p. 295).  Schlesinger 
reported that this uncertainty pervaded even the CIA team assigned with supervision of 
the plan,  
“The Special group itself was infected with interregnum uncertainties.  Not 
wishing to anticipate the new administration it did not formally approve the new 
scheme or even subject it to very severe scrutiny.”  (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 235) 
 
The transitional ambiguity allowed planners on both sides of the transition to assume that 
responsibility and ownership rested elsewhere.  Ultimately, neither party assumed 
ownership until the consequences of the ill-conceived plan were irreversible.  
 This ambiguity allowed the plan to gain momentum despite the crippling lack of 
ownership or analysis.  By the time that President Kennedy was briefed on the plan in 
January, 1961, he was reportedly, “astonished at its magnitude and daring” (Sorensen, 
1965, p. 295).  Without final approval from either Eisenhower or Kennedy, the CIA was 
training a brigade of exiled Cubans in Guatemala for the invasion.  The cooperation of 
the Guatemalan government was waning and the CIA was told that the brigade had to 
leave by the end of April (Etheredge, 1985, p. 13).  This was one of several arguments 
used by CIA planners Dulles and Bissell to convince the Kennedy administration that a 
quick decision was necessary.  The CIA also suspected that the Soviet Union was sending 
jet airplanes to update Castro‟s air force.  After these planes arrived on June 1, the CIA 
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argued that the invasion would be next to impossible (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 240).  In 
reality, Castro‟s air force was much more formidable than the CIA realized and the 
Soviet jets were not the only thing preventing a successful invasion.  Other factors 
creating pressure to act included the approaching rainy season in Cuba and growing 
media speculation about the presence of the brigade in Guatemala (Freedman, 2000, p. 
136).  Freedman describes the detrimental effect of this race to act from the perspective 
of General David Gray, the only contact between the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 
“Gray later acknowledged that because they were racing against the clock, with 
the rainy season approaching, Castro‟s forces being strengthened, Guatemala 
wanting the rebels out, some rebels threatening to desert, and newsmen sniffing 
around the whole operation, he „did not even have time to war-game the plan.‟”  
(Freedman, 2000, p. 136) 
 
The existence of this brigade also created what planners referred to as the 
„disposal problem.‟  As the plan progressed, Dulles warned Kennedy that the plan could 
not be easily discarded, 
 Don‟t forget that we have a disposal problem.  If we have to take these men out of  
Guatemala, we will have to transfer them to the United States, and we can‟t have 
them wandering around the country telling everyone what they have been doing.   
(Dulles quoted in Schlesinger, 1965, p. 242) 
 
As Kennedy became increasingly preoccupied with deniability, he embraced Dulles‟ 
warning as his own.  Schlesinger quotes Kennedy on April 7, the week before the attack, 
If we have to get rid of these 800 men, it is much better to dump them in Cuba 
than in the United States, especially if that is where they want to go.  (Kennedy 
quoted in Schlesinger, 1965, p. 257) 
 
Without adequate time or information to critique the inherited plan, the Kennedy 
administration came to believe that implementation was the only alternative and that a 
Cuban invasion was inevitable.        
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Transitional Limitations: Holdover Effect 
 Momentum for the operation was also pushed forward by the holdover effect.  
After assuming office, the Kennedy administration had to deal with both policies and 
personnel that carried over from the Eisenhower administration.   Most presidential 
policies and initiatives, especially in the foreign policy realm, do not come to a neat 
conclusion at the end of a presidential term.  Each new administration must decide how to 
manage the work they inherit from their predecessors.  President Kennedy faced that 
decision when he was briefed on the Bay of Pigs plan shortly before he assumed office.  
Initial planning for the Bay of Pigs invasion was launched under the Eisenhower 
administration and carried over into the Kennedy administration.  This overlap generated 
two diametrically opposed influences on the planning process: internal reluctance to take 
ownership of the plan and external political pressure to embrace the plan.      
 Internally, the Kennedy administration was reluctant to take ownership of a plan 
that was not of their making.  Etheredge (1985) speculates that the administration 
resented the policy they inherited: 
“They resented being trapped by his [Eisenhower] plan now when, having 
defeated him and what he stood for, they had obtained power.  They would not be 
rid of the plan directly, but they could distance themselves, withhold the personal 
involvement that would make it their own and make it work, and allow it to screw 
up.”  (Etheredge, 1985, p. 16) 
   
Whether or not the distance was deliberate, Kennedy and his team were removed from 
key information that could have served as a warning of the incoming crisis.  The 
administration never fully embraced the plan, even moments before it was launched.  
Kennedy reserved the option to call off the operation as late as twenty-four hours prior to 
the scheduled launch (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 234).   
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 Despite internal reservations, the Kennedy administration could not completely 
disavow the plan.  They faced tremendous political pressure to approve the operation.  By 
the time Kennedy assumed office in January, 1961, the plan was rapidly progressing and 
the United States had suspended diplomatic relations with Cuba (Freedman, 2000, p. 
127).  On the eve of the Inauguration, Eisenhower gave Kennedy his recommendation 
that the emerging plan, “be continued and accelerated,” (Eisenhower quoted in Freedman, 
2000, p. 127).  The political pressure that faces any new president was magnified for the 
Kennedy administration because of Eisenhower‟s undeniable foreign policy credentials.  
Kennedy feared appearing weak when compared with Eisenhower‟s strong military 
experience.  Eisenhower was a five-star Army general who served as Supreme 
Commander of the Allied forces in Europe during World War II and as Supreme 
Commander of NATO after the War.  Ted Sorensen (1965) described the pressure on 
Kennedy to accept the overlap policy:  
“He was in effect asked whether he was as willing as the Republicans to permit 
and assist these exiles to free their own island from dictatorship, or whether he 
was willing to liquidate well-laid preparations, leave Cuba free to subvert the 
hemisphere, disband an impatient army in training for nearly a year under 
miserable conditions, and have them spread the word that Kennedy had betrayed 
their attempt to depose Castro.”  (Sorensen, 1965, p. 295) 
 
A quote from Robert Kennedy confirms the pressure that the administration felt to 
approve the plan, “Eisenhower trained these people, it was Eisenhower‟s plan, 
Eisenhower‟s people all said it would succeed – and we turned it down.”  (R. Kennedy 
quoted in Pious, 2008, p. 43) 
Pressure to approve the plan also came from key officials who had been appointed 
during the Eisenhower administration.  On the advice of Richard Neustadt, Kennedy left 
several sensitive officials in their posts after the transition including the planners of the 
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Cuban invasion: CIA director Allen Dulles and Director of Plans Richard Bissell 
(Sorensen, 1965, p. 230).  Dulles and Bissell were both involved in the successful 
operation to overthrow Guatemalan President Jacob Arbenz in 1954 and believed that 
Castro could be overthrown with a comparable operation in Cuba.  In their roles as carry-
overs, Bissell and Dulles had to convince the new administration of the merits of the 
Cuban invasion plan.  Schlesinger suggests that this limited critical analysis of the plan.  
He wrote,  
Both Dulles and Bissell were at a disadvantage in having to persuade a skeptical 
new administration about the virtues of a proposal nurtured in the hospital bosom 
of a previous government – a proposal on which they had personally worked for a 
long time and in which their organization had a heavy vested interest.  This cast 
them in the role less of analysts than of advocates, and it led them to accept 
progressive modifications so long as the expedition in some form remained.   
(Schlesinger, 1965, p. 241) 
 
In this atmosphere, Dulles and Bissell became extremely protective of the plan and 
accepted several ill-advised modifications.  With little input from other agencies, the 
plan‟s strongest advocates were also the only ones advising the administration on the 
merits of the plan (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 248).  As a result, critical analysis was extremely 
limited.   
Transitional Limitations: Inexperience 
 Critical analysis of the plan was also limited by the inexperience of the Kennedy 
administration.  As previously discussed, the transition period is inherently precarious 
because incoming presidents are often ill-equipped to respond to world events in the early 
moments of the administration.  Inexperience contributed to the dramatic 
mismanagement of both the planning and implementation of the Cuban invasion in three 
key ways: inexperience dealing with information and decisions at the presidential level, 
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the use of ad-hoc decision-making processes that had not yet been tested during a crisis, 
and the administration‟s inexperience working with each other.   
 At the start of the crisis, Kennedy had only been in office for seventy-seven days 
(Schlesinger, 1965, p. 258).  Like most modern presidents, Kennedy had little experience 
in foreign affairs prior to assuming the presidency.  When then-candidate Kennedy was 
briefed on the plans during the transition period, his newly-assembled team lacked 
sufficient time or experience to critically examine the plans (Halperin & Clapp, 2006).  
Elected to the House of Representatives in 1946 and the U.S. Senate in 1952, Kennedy 
felt confident making decisions in the domestic realm.  However, he did not yet trust his 
instincts on foreign policy.  Kennedy himself described the problem,  
 If someone comes in to tell me this or that about the minimum wage bill I have no  
hesitation in overruling them.  But you always assume that the military and 
intelligence people have some secret skill not available to ordinary mortals.  
(Kennedy quoted in Campbell & Steinberg, 2008, p. 27) 
 
This hesitation is only lessened by foreign policy experience, something post-WWII 
presidents do not have until after the first few years of their term.   
Even Kennedy‟s top foreign policy advisors had been removed from the process 
for several years prior to assuming office.  Kennedy‟s administration began in 1961 after 
8 years of Republican control of the White House.  The policy makers with the most 
current foreign policy experience were Republican.  Kennedy‟s Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk was a foreign affairs advisor for President Truman.  During the Eisenhower 
administration, however, his role as head of the Rockefeller Foundation removed him 
from day-to-day foreign policy decisions.  Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was a 
statistician who had built his career at the Ford Motor Company (Janis, 1982, p. 17).  
McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and Presidential 
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Advisor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. were both noted intellectuals at Harvard University.  The 
team brought a tremendous amount of intellect but, along with Kennedy, they lacked 
confidence with day-to-day foreign policy decisions.  This confidence could only be 
gained with experience. 
 As Kennedy‟s quote suggests, inexperience led to an overreliance on the advice of 
military and intelligence officials.  The administration did not have the experience or 
knowledge to realize that the assumptions surrounding their decision were faulty and ill-
prepared.  These assumptions penetrated all phases of planning and implementation.  
Rather than the ill-fated Bay of Pigs landing site, CIA planners Dulles and Bissell 
initially proposed landing an invasion force in the town of Trinidad.  Schlesinger 
explained that the Trinidad landing site offered several advantages.  First, the harbor and 
beachhead were conducive to an amphibious landing.  Next, the town of Trinidad was far 
from any of Castro‟s forces.  Finally, and most importantly, Trinidad offered a 
convenient escape route through the nearby Escambray Mountains.  If the invasion did 
not succeed in toppling Castro‟s forces, the brigade could escape through the mountains 
and engage in guerilla activity (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 327).  Under the illusion that U.S. 
involvement in the operation could be concealed, President Kennedy objected to the 
Trinidad landing site because he thought the location was too “spectacular,” (Kennedy 
quoted in Freedman, 2000, p. 134).  Instead he requested the CIA develop a quieter plan 
that would conceal U.S. involvement.   
 Kennedy sought advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the three alternate plans 
presented by the CIA.  In a written memo, the Joint Chiefs selected Zapata, or the Bay of 
Pigs, as the best of the three alternatives presented.  The inexperienced administration did 
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not question the recommendation and misinterpreted a lukewarm statement as a full-
fledged endorsement.  Freedman describes this judgment error, 
To get the full benefit of its evaluation when it came in the start of February 
required some reading between the lines – not so easy for a civilian leadership not 
yet used to military formulations.  (Freedman, 2000, p. 131) 
 
The Bay of Pigs landing site was surrounded by swamps and did not offer the option for 
the brigade to resort to guerilla combat.  However, Kennedy was not aware that his 
decision removed the guerilla option.  Entrenched in their positions as advocates rather 
than analysts, the CIA planners did nothing to correct his misperception (Pious, 2008, p. 
36).   
Unwilling to completely disengage from the plan, Kennedy became increasingly 
preoccupied with maintaining deniability.  In his memoir Kennedy, Sorensen wrote that 
Kennedy‟s directive to avoid overt American involvement was established from the 
earliest days of the administration (Sorensen, 1965, p. 297).  Kennedy‟s team naively 
believed that an international outcry could be easily avoided by concealing U.S. 
involvement in the operation.  As the new administration soon learned, operations of this 
magnitude are not likely to remain concealed from the public or the media.  Kennedy 
himself realized this soon before the invasion and complained, “I can‟t believe what I‟m 
reading!  Castro doesn‟t need agents over here.  All he has to do is read our papers.  It‟s 
all laid out for him!” (Kennedy quoted in Janis, 1982, p. 20).  In fact, the deniability that 
Kennedy demanded was called into question within the first few hours of the operation 
when one of the Cuban Brigade planes had to make an emergency landing in Key West 
instead of returning to the discreet airbase in Guatamala (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 270).        
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 These assumptions may have been called into question with proper analysis of the 
plan.  Instead information was closely guarded on a “need to know” basis.  The covert 
nature of the operation resulted in inadequate vetting of the plan by the appropriate 
government departments.  Even the Intelligence Branch of the CIA was not consulted 
(Schlesinger, 1965, p. 248).  Further consultation could have corrected the faulty premise 
that Castro‟s air force was ineffective and weak.  Janis describes the administration‟s 
incredible miscalculation:  
Their overoptimistic outlook would have been rudely shaken if they had allowed 
their deliberations to focus on the potentially devastating consequences of the 
obvious drawbacks of the plan, such as the disparity in size between Castro‟s 
military forces of two hundred thousand and the small brigade of fourteen 
hundred exiles.  In a sense, this difference made the odds against their longshot 
gamble 200,000 to 1,400 (over 140 to 1). 
 (Janis, 1982, p. 36)  
Schlesinger speculated that the Intelligence Branch would have also warned that Castro 
enjoyed a higher level of public support than the planners expected (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 
248).  The ultimate success of the invasion plan depended on internal revolts within Cuba 
which did not occur.  Any evaluation of popular support for Castro within Cuba would 
have questioned the veracity of this claim (Pious, 2008, p. 33).  The dominant advice 
given to the president came from the plan‟s principal advocates: Dulles and Bissell.  By 
restricting consultation on a “need to know” basis, the inexperienced administration 
unknowingly restricted access to necessary information.  Kennedy‟s team did not have 
adequate experience to question the faulty information they received. 
The team‟s inexperience is also evident in the decision-making processes at work 
during the crisis.  Only three months into the new administration, the foreign policy team 
was adapting to the new decision-making procedures implemented by Kennedy.  In a 
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departure from the highly formalized, bureaucracy-dependent process of Eisenhower, 
Kennedy preferred informal arrangements with the advisors he trusted most.  Ad-hoc task 
forces were created in response to foreign policy problems.  While tempering the 
formality that characterized Eisenhower‟s White House, the task forces also limited 
critical analysis.  The Taylor Commission, which was appointed by President Kennedy 
after the Bay of Pigs crisis, highlighted concerns with Kennedy‟s decision-making 
procedures,  
 Top level direction was given through ad hoc meetings of senior officials without 
consideration of operational plans in writing and with no arrangement for 
recording conclusions and decisions reached.  (Taylor Commission quoted in 
Stern, 1997, p. 173) 
 
Changes made to these procedures following the crisis indicate that these processes 
stemmed from the inexperience of the administration.  Determined not to step into a 
similar fiasco, President Kennedy dramatically modified his decision-making procedures 
after the Bay of Pigs crisis.  Schafer & Crichlow explain,  
“He introduced a system where some advisors were assigned the role of 
challenging assumptions and asking hard questions.  He included a larger number 
of advisors in the process and brought in outsiders who had different kinds of 
expertise and could challenge intra-administration perspectives.  Concerned that 
his own presence might hinder free discussion at meetings, he pointedly stepped 
out of some meetings, allowing his advisors to speak their minds more freely and 
reducing the potential appearance of leader bias.” 
 (Schafer & Crichlow, 2010, p. 10) 
Several of these new procedures were prominent in the administration‟s response to the 
Cuban Missile Crisis a few years later.    
 Another challenge for the inexperienced administration was dealing with the crisis 
while officials were still learning to work with each other and within the larger 
38 
 
government bureaucracy.  In examining the crisis, Harper Magazine’s John Fischer 
described the problem:  
“Every President needs about twelve months to get his executive team organized, 
to feel his way into the vast and dangerous machinery of the bureaucracy … 
While [Kennedy] was still trying to move in the furniture, in effect, he found the 
roof falling in and the doors blowing off.”  (Fischer quoted in Sorensen, 1965, p. 
291) 
 
In a departure from the highly formalized, bureaucracy-dependent process of Eisenhower, 
Kennedy preferred informal arrangements with the advisors he most trusted.  Most 
information was conferred in verbal briefings and few details were recorded (Freedman, 
2000, p. 127).   
Along with the “need to know” mentality, this decision-making process also 
prevented critical analysis.  No mechanism was in place to prevent compartmentalism 
and relevant voices were left out of the discussion.  Robert Kennedy and Ted Sorensen, 
two of Kennedy‟s closest advisors, were not directly involved in the Bay of Pigs plan 
(Schlesinger, 1965, p. 296).  Both Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff were discouraged from consulting knowledgeable colleagues at the State and 
Defense departments (Mosher, 1987).  By the time the plan was implemented, Kennedy 
had very little accurate information.  Schlesinger wrote that, “… he [Kennedy] had in fact 
approved a plan bearing little resemblance to what he thought he approved.” (Sorensen, 
1965, p. 310).    
The administration had also not yet learned the strengths and weaknesses of their 
colleagues.  This further limited the administration‟s capacity to critically evaluate 
information.  Janis (1982) explains:  
“Kennedy himself did not yet know the strengths and weaknesses of his newly 
appointed advisors.  For example, the President did not realize, as he did later, 
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that the new Secretary of State was inclined to defer to the military experts and to 
withhold his objections to the Defense Department toughness in order to avoid 
charges of State Department softness.”  (Janis, 1982, p. 31) 
 
Interactions within the administration were governed by protocol and formality (Janis, 
1982, p. 31).  Frank conversations may have revealed that many members of Kennedy‟s 
team were suppressing strong reservations about the viability of the operation.  Among 
Kennedy‟s closest advisors, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Special Assistant Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. both expressed grave concerns about the plan.  Rusk warned repeatedly 
that an invasion of Cuba would likely be condemned by the Organization of American 
States and the United Nations (Freedman, 2000, p. 133).  He cautioned that international 
condemnation was too high a price, even if the invasion was successful in toppling 
Castro.  Schlesinger delivered a memo to the president expressing his own opposition to 
the plan.  He warned of the stakes involved: 
“…the image of intelligence, reasonableness and honest firmness which has had 
such an extraordinary effect in changing world opinion about the U.S. and 
increasing world confidence in U.S. methods and purposes…  It is this 
reawakening of world faith in America which is at stake in the Cuban operation.”  
(Schlesinger, 1965, p. 255) 
 
However, neither Schlesinger nor Rusk was successful in overturning the momentum of 
the plan.  Schlesinger even described his opposition as “timid,” (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 
255).  Concerns were also discussed by second-tier advisors including Chester Bowles, 
Thomas Mann, and Roger Hilsman at the State Department.  While these doubts and 
reservations were discussed at all levels of the administration, the overwhelming 
consensus was that the invasion plan had developed past the point of withdrawal.   
 The dominant role of inexperience in the Bay of Pigs breakdown is reinforced by 
Kennedy‟s actions following the crisis.  He immediately implemented new decision-
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making policies and procedures in hopes of moving beyond the early missteps of his 
administration.  Internally, Kennedy addressed the “need to know” mentality that limited 
analysis of the plan.  Schlesinger explained,  
“In the future, he made sure that he had the unfettered and confidential access of 
his own people …   The Bay of Pigs gave us a license for the impolite inquiry and 
the rude comment.”  (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 296) 
 
Following the crisis, Kennedy also relied less on the experts and more on the officials 
that he most trusted (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 296).  Schlesinger reported that these lessons 
played a major role in Kennedy‟s handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, “…he preserved 
a taut personal control over every aspect of the situation; the Bay of Pigs had not been in 
vain” (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 818).  This evidence of lessons learned supports the claim 
that inexperience was the primary cause for mismanagement of the crisis.  Kennedy also 
appointed General Maxwell Taylor chair of a Cuba Study Group designed to identify 
lessons from the Bay of Pigs fiasco.  Robert Kennedy and Allen Dulles were also 
members of the Taylor Commission.  The Commission concluded that the preoccupation 
with deniability eliminated any possibility for the operation‟s success.  Freedman argues 
that this conclusion overlooks the administration‟s inexperience as a primary cause of the 
crisis,  
The weakness in the decision making reflected the problems of an administration 
that had not yet sorted out its lines of responsibility.  Kennedy was still learning 
whom he could trust, how to take advice, and how to balance different types of 
risk, including the extent to which he should worry about domestic critics when 
making foreign policy.  (Freedman, 2000, p. 146) 
 
It is impossible to predict whether the invasion plan would have been more successful 
without the challenges added by the transition period.  However, the holdover effects, 
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ambiguity, and inexperience that accompanied the Eisenhower/Kennedy transition 
ensured the policy‟s failure. 
Applying the Transitional Limitations Model to Existing Analysis 
 Transitional crises like the Bay of Pigs demonstrate the increased vulnerability of 
new administrations.  During these crises, a power vacuum allows other forces to replace 
presidential initiative and leadership.  Inexperience and ambiguity can be observed to 
varying degrees during any presidential transition.  These variables, however, do not 
cause miscalculations alone.  The case studies in this paper follow the causal relationship 
illustrated below: 
Transitional Limitations           X                         Miscalculation 
Independent Variation              Intervening Variable         Dependent Variable 
 
In this relationship, transitional limitations create policy uncertainty (presidential 
indecision and inattention) which allows X forces to replace presidential leadership, 
resulting in policy miscalculations.  During the Bay of Pigs crisis, groupthink and 
bureaucratic politics were two of the intervening variables at work. 
 Traditional analyses of the Bay of Pigs incident point to dysfunctional forces 
including groupthink and bureaucratic politics as the reason for the procedural 
breakdown and resulting crisis.  They do not explain, however, why these forces were 
allowed to play such a prominent role in presidential decision making.  The Transitional 
Limitations Model outlined above fills this gap.  Transitional limitations created a 
dynamic of policy uncertainty in which American objectives were unclear and American 
foreign policy drifted without a cohesive direction.  During the Bay of Pigs crisis, the 
transition period created the policy uncertainty that allowed transitional limitations to 
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govern the foreign policy process.  In the following sections, I will examine the role of 
groupthink and bureaucratic politics through the Transitional Limitations Model to 
demonstrate how this framework offers a more complete explanation of the Bay of Pigs 
crisis. 
Overview of Janis’s Groupthink Theory 
 Irving Janis introduced the groupthink concept in 1972 as an explanation for what 
he saw as seemingly unthinkable miscalculations by decision makers.  Drawing on his 
background in group psychology, Janis posited that members of a cohesive group can 
unconsciously merge their arguments to a set of shared beliefs and norms.  Group 
members subconsciously prioritize group harmony and unanimity over critical analysis 
and reasoning.  Janis explains, “Groupthink refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, 
reality testing, and moral judgment that results from in-group pressures” (Janis, 1982, p. 
9).  In this way, groupthink presents a huge barrier to effective decision making. 
 The Bay of Pigs was Janis‟s prime example of mismanagement at the highest 
levels.  Janis asked the same question that emerged immediately following the crisis, 
“How could bright, shrewd men like John F. Kennedy and his advisors be taken in by the 
CIA‟s stupid, patchwork plan?” (Janis, 1982, p. vii).   Janis‟s answer was that groupthink 
plagued the team‟s decision making process and prevented critical analysis of the CIA‟s 
plan.  Using firsthand accounts from Arthur Schlesinger, Ted Sorensen, and others, Janis 
identified six flawed assumptions of the Kennedy administration that led to the Bay of 
Pigs crisis.  First, the administration naively believed that U.S. involvement in the 
operation could be concealed from the public and the media.  Next, the administration 
vastly underestimated the capability of Castro‟s air force.  Third, Kennedy and his team 
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accepted without question the CIA‟s assurance that morale was high within the exile 
brigade.  They also blindly believed the CIA‟s estimate that the small exile brigade would 
be able to easily control the beachhead.  Fifth, the administration underestimated popular 
support for Castro and expected the invasion to spur a large scale uprising in Cuba.  
Finally, the planners assumed that the exile brigade could easily retreat into the 
Escambray Mountains (Janis, 1982, p. 26).  As events unfolded, it became clear that all of 
these assumptions were tragically miscalculated.  Each of these assumptions was 
perpetuated by the inexperience and ambiguity of the presidential transition period.   
Groupthink within the Transitional Limitations Model 
Janis presents groupthink as the independent variable that caused the 
miscalculation.  This explanation is incomplete without considering the limitations of the 
transition period.  Due to the nature of the American democratic system, the 
responsibility for responding to international crises rests with the president.  During the 
Bay of Pigs crisis, the Kennedy administration failed to perform this vital role.   
Within the Transitional Limitations Model, transitional limitations create the power 
vacuum which allows groupthink to emerge as a dominant force in the decision making 
process.  The role of groupthink in the Bay of Pigs decision-making process can be 
illustrated as follows: 
     
  Transitional Limitations      Groupthink                            Miscalculation 
    Independent Variable        Intervening Variable           Dependent Variable 
 
This relationship emerges when examining the six flaws in the administration‟s process 
that Janis identifies as symptomatic of groupthink.  Each of these flaws is rooted in the 
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transitional framework discussed above: inexperience, transitional ambiguity, and the 
holdover effect.   
First, Janis argues that the Kennedy administration entered office with an “illusion 
of invulnerability” and “unlimited confidence” that encouraged risk-taking and 
discouraged realistic evaluation of the consequences involved.  As previously discussed, 
the Kennedy administration vastly underestimated Castro‟s capabilities and blindly 
accepted the CIA‟s overconfident assertions.  The administration‟s overconfidence only 
partially explains why the “illusion of invulnerability” was so prevalent among officials 
who should have known better.  The administration‟s inexperience and untested 
procedures also perpetuated false information.  Kennedy had the written endorsement of 
General Lemnitzer & Admiral Burke of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the approval 
of Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara (Sorensen, 1965, p. 
296).  Kennedy was not yet familiar with the strengths and weaknesses of his team.  He 
accepted the endorsements with very little analysis and did not critically evaluate the 
lukewarm endorsements he received from his advisors.  This flaw clearly stemmed from 
transitional limitations.   
  Transitional limitations also preceded Janis‟s second flaw.  He argues that the 
administration also experienced the “illusion of unanimity” which stifled debate and 
opposition in group meetings.  Janis explains, 
“…the assumed consensus was an illusion that could be maintained only because 
the major participants did not reveal their own reasoning or discuss their 
idiosyncratic assumptions and vague reservations.”  (Janis, 1982, p. 38) 
 
Janis‟s explanation overlooks the primary cause of the “illusion of unanimity.”  Both 
Sorensen and Schlesinger point to inexperience as a primary reason for the lack of critical 
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scrutiny of the plan.  The administration was still learning how to work with each other 
and within the complex governmental bureaucracy.  Schlesinger noted that Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara had little attention to devote to the plan because he “was 
absorbed in the endless task of trying to seize control of the Pentagon” (Schlesinger, 
1965, p. 250).  Sorensen explained that multiple false assumptions arose because, 
“…of the newness of the President and his administration.  He did not fully know 
the strengths and weaknesses of his various advisors.  He did not yet feel he could 
trust his instincts against the judgments of recognized experts.  He had not yet 
geared the decision-making process to fulfill his own needs, to isolate the points 
of no return, to make certain he was fully informed before they passed, and to 
prevent preshaped alternatives from being presented to him too late to start anew.  
Nor were his advisors as frank with him, or as free to criticize each other‟s work, 
as they would later become.”  (Sorensen, 1965, p. 304) 
 
Following the Bay of Pigs crisis, Kennedy modified his decision-making process to 
facilitate critical scrutiny.  He established the Special Group Counterinsurgency to 
oversee all interagency counterinsurgency efforts (Freedman, 2000, 147).  This new 
group addressed the problem of inadequate oversight by allowing closer collaboration 
between the President and key officials planning operations overseas.  Kennedy‟s 
attention to these weaknesses in the remaining years of his presidency is further proof 
that the administration‟s inexperience was a major factor in the Bay of Pigs 
miscalculation.    
Janis‟s third and fourth flaws are closely related to the “illusion of unanimity” and 
were also preceded by transitional limitations.  He notes that key members of the decision 
making process, including Arthur Schlesinger and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 
suppressed personal doubts in favor of group consensus.  Similarly, several key members, 
including Robert Kennedy, made a concerted effort to suppress the doubts of others in the 
group.     
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Janis also argues that President Kennedy discouraged analysis by allowing the 
CIA to dominate meetings.  According to the firsthand accounts of Schlesinger and 
Sorensen, Kennedy and his team accepted the CIA‟s assessment of the situation in Cuba 
with little scrutiny.  Kennedy himself admitted to being unwilling to question his military 
and intelligence advisors when he first assumed the presidency (Campbell & Steinberg, 
2008, p. 27).  The administration was unaware that CIA agents were deliberately 
misleading the exile brigade with false promises of U.S. participation in the invasion 
(Janis, 1982, p. 22).         
Finally, Janis suggests that CIA planners Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell were 
given favored status as new members of the group, tempering critical analysis.  Janis 
explains,  
“It seems that Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell, despite being holdovers from the  
Eisenhower administration, were not considered outsiders by the inner core of the 
Kennedy team… The core members of the team would certainly want to avoid 
antagonizing or alienating them.  They would be inclined, therefore, to soft-pedal 
their criticisms of the CIA plan and perhaps even to suspend their critical 
judgment in evaluating it.”  (Janis, 1982, p. 45) 
 
Along with the Bay of Pigs plan itself, Dulles and Bissell were both holdovers from the 
Eisenhower administration.  With the change of administration, they became the primary 
representatives of a plan that predated anyone else in the administration.  As previously 
discussed, this situation shifted their role from analysts to advocates and limited critical 
analysis from those most familiar with the plan (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 241).  Janis‟s 
explanation of Dulles and Bissell‟s roles overlooks this holdover effect.  Not only was the 
administration reluctant to question Dulles and Bissell, but the two men were much 
stronger advocates than they had been during the Eisenhower administration.  Each of the 
flaws resulted from transitional limitations.  Strong presidential leadership and effective 
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executive decision-making would have eliminated the flaws that Janis highlights.  
Groupthink was only allowed to dominate presidential decision-making because of 
transitional limitations.   
Overview of Bureaucratic Politics Theories 
Existing analysis of the Bay of Pigs crisis also points to bureaucratic politics as a 
primary reason for the breakdown.  Bureaucratic politics is the study of how the inner 
workings of bureaucracies impact both the creation and implementation of foreign policy 
(Krieger, 2001, p. 95).  Within the American political system, this phenomenon manifests 
itself in two ways.  First, the theory suggests that bureaucrats will take different positions 
on an issue depending on the department where they work.  For example, an official 
immersed in State Department culture will take a different stance than one from the 
Department of Defense.  Another part of the bureaucratic politics theory is the argument 
that foreign policy decisions do not represent one voice, but the maneuvering and 
compromises of different bureaucratic departments.  Bureaucratic politics is an 
unavoidable byproduct of the American democratic system.  However, when policy 
uncertainty allows bureaucratic politics to dominate the presidential decision-making 
process, the maneuvering becomes a dysfunctional and often dangerous force.  Several 
existing analyses of the Bay of Pigs plan argue that this maneuvering led to the 
breakdown and resulting crisis.  Like Janis‟s groupthink model, the bureaucratic politics 
models do not offer a complete explanation of the crisis without the lens of the 
transitional framework.   
In Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, Halperin & Clapp highlight the Bay 
of Pigs crisis as an example of bureaucratic maneuvering.  In the early days of an 
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administration, bureaucracies and officials vie for influence and leadership in the new 
government.  Halperin & Clapp argue that the CIA presented the Cuban invasion plan 
from a position of strength.  This advantage allowed the CIA to limit input from other 
departments (Freedman, 2000, p. 125).  Halperin & Clapp (2006) explain, 
“White House officials are sometimes able to control a briefing presented to the 
president, and they use that power to keep out undesirable information…in the 
case of the Bay of Pigs, both the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research and the CIA‟s Intelligence Branch were not informed of the impending 
invasion and were thus unable to report to the president their own view that an 
invasion was unlikely to spark the uprising in Cuba that the operations branch of 
the CIA was promising.” 
(Halperin & Clapp, 2006, p. 170)  
Halperin & Clapp further argue that bureaucratic maneuvering not only restricted but also 
distorted the information given to President Kennedy.   
“When, however, the advocates of a certain policy are able to keep out of the 
process those with alternative sources of information and expertise, the distortions 
can be very great.”  (Halperin & Clapp, 2006, p. 175) 
 
The CIA was able to effectively limit alternative analyses, ensuring that the information 
received by President Kennedy was biased and one-sided.  
As planning progressed, another symptom of bureaucratic maneuvering emerged: 
the principal agent problem.  The principal agent problem occurs when the leader is 
unaware of actions taken by a subordinate.  As Ted Sorensen argues in Kennedy (1965), 
the principal agent problem was another contributing factor in the Bay of Pigs crisis.  
Both Eisenhower and Kennedy viewed the invasion as a “contingency plan,” and neither 
realized the full extent of the operation until it was close to implementation.  Sorensen 
argues that this mentality allowed the bureaucracy to govern presidential decision-
making:   
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“Instead of the President telling the bureaucracy that action was necessary and 
that they should devise certain means, the bureaucracy was telling the President 
that action was necessary, and that the means were already fashioned – and 
making his approval, moreover, appear to be a test of his mettle.” (Sorensen, 
1965, p. 306) 
 
Along with controlling presidential decisions, the bureaucracy also acted independent of 
a presidential mandate.  As discussed earlier, Kennedy was increasingly preoccupied with 
deniability as he became convinced that implementation was unavoidable.  Both Kennedy 
and Eisenhower explicitly prohibited overt American involvement in the invasion.  
Despite this prohibition, CIA planners proceeded with the expectation of American 
involvement.  The CIA expected that Kennedy‟s opposition to overt involvement would 
waver if the success of the operation was threatened.  Realizing that the success of the 
operation could rely on the involvement of American forces, they believed that the 
President would relent if given the choice between open involvement or failure.  A quote 
from Allen Dulles after the crisis supports Sorensen‟s observation that the bureaucracy 
was effectively controlling the presidency:  
“We felt that when the chips were down – when the crisis arose in reality, any 
action required for success would be authorized rather than permit the enterprise 
to fail.”  (Dulles quoted in Pious, 2008, p. 37) 
 
The CIA even led the Cuban Brigade to expect overt American involvement if necessary.  
Only when the Brigade was abandoned on the Zapata beachhead did they realize that 
American support was not coming.  By limiting information and acting independently of 
the presidency, the bureaucracy did exert dominating influence during the Bay of Pigs 
crisis.  Existing analysis however, does not recognize the role of the transition in allowing 
this influence to emerge.     
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Bureaucratic Politics in the Transitional Limitations Model 
 Once again, examining the existing analyses through the transitional framework 
offers a more complete analysis of the Bay of Pigs crisis.  In this model, transitional 
limitations create the policy uncertainty that allows bureaucratic forces to dominate 
presidential decision-making, leading to a tragic miscalculation. 
  Transitional Limitations         Bureaucratic politics                 Miscalculation 
    Independent Variable              Intervening Variable  Dependent Variable 
Both of the existing bureaucratic politics analyses discussed in the previous section offer 
a clearer explanation of the Bay of Pigs crisis when examined within this framework.   
 Halperin & Clapp argue that bureaucratic maneuvering allowed the CIA to restrict 
the information presented to President Kennedy in the months leading up to the invasion.  
Multiple accounts of the crisis verify that the CIA did dominate the Bay of Pigs decision 
process.  However, Halperin & Clapp overlook the primary reason for the CIA‟s 
bureaucratic advantage.  As previously discussed, Allen Dulles was a holdover from the 
Eisenhower administration and was reappointed by President Kennedy immediately after 
he assumed office.  Dulles did not have to face the same learning curve as the other 
agency directors and cabinet secretaries.    Allen Dulles‟s status as a holdover from the 
Eisenhower administration gave the CIA an advantage over other departments in 
Kennedy‟s administration and allowed the department to dominate presidential decision-
making.  In a conversation with Arthur Schlesinger following the crisis, Kennedy 
acknowledged that he failed to critically examine information from Dulles:  
“I probably made a mistake in keeping Allen Dulles on.  It‟s not that Dulles is not 
a man of great ability.  He is.  But I have never worked with him, and therefore I 
can‟t estimate his meaning when he tells me things… Dulles is legendary figure, 
and it‟s hard to operate with legendary figures.”  (Kennedy quoted in Schlesinger, 
1965, p. 276) 
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The holdover effect explains both why and how the CIA presented unexamined and 
distorted information to the president about the crisis.  As previously discussed, Dulles 
and Bissell both became advocates for the policy rather than analysts.  This problem was 
magnified by the unfamiliarity of Kennedy‟s team with presidential decision-making.  
The administration lacked experience and confidence in the foreign policy realm.  This 
led them to accept distorted information without question.  The holdover effect and 
inexperience created policy uncertainty which allowed bureaucratic maneuvering to 
dominate presidential decision-making.     
 Transitional limitations also explain why the principal agent problem was allowed 
to emerge during the crisis.  As previously discussed, transitional ambiguity allowed the 
plan to progress with very little presidential oversight.  Schlesinger noted that the 
planners pushed CIA operatives to move forward with training in Guatemala even before 
the incoming Kennedy administration had been briefed on the plan (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 
234).  Even after the plan was approved, it was easy for the CIA operatives to take 
advantage of the administration‟s inexperience to disregard Kennedy‟s requests.   
Inexperience also prevented the Kennedy administration from questioning the 
CIA‟s assessment of the situation in Cuba after they were briefed on the plans.  Dramatic 
miscalculations may have been revealed if the administration had asked the right 
questions or consulted the proper sources.  Following the crisis, Kennedy realized that his 
administration had willingly accepted flawed assumptions without question or analysis.  
Schlesinger described this realization: 
“He [Kennedy] felt that he now knew certain soft spots in his administration, 
especially the CIA and the Joint Chiefs.  He would never be overawed by 
professional military advice again.”  (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 290)  
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Sorensen also acknowledges that inexperience led the administration to accept 
information they would have otherwise questioned. 
“He [Kennedy] should never have believed that it would be arrogant and 
presumptuous of him, newly arrived on the scene, to call out the plans of the 
renowned experts and the brave exiles.  He should never have permitted the 
project to proceed so early in his first year, before he knew the men he was 
listening to and while he was still full of deep-rooted doubts.” (Sorensen, 1965, p. 
306) 
 
All of the lessons that the Kennedy administration learned following the crisis reveal the 
role of inexperience in the plan‟s failure.  Coupled with the ambiguity of the transition 
period and the dysfunction of holdover policies and advisors, this inexperience created 
policy uncertainty that allowed presidential decision-making to be dominated by 
groupthink and bureaucratic politics.   
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SOMALIA INTERVENTION, 1992-1994 
 Thirty years after the Bay of Pigs disaster, a parallel crisis developed in the 
transition period between the Republican administration of George H.W. Bush and the 
Democratic administration of Bill Clinton.  In the last months of his presidency, President 
Bush launched a relief operation designed to stem the humanitarian crisis in Somalia.  
Despite overly-optimistic estimates of the Bush administration, American forces were 
still on the ground in Somalia when President Clinton assumed office on January 20, 
1993.  Without a clear policy direction, the operation lingered until widespread 
condemnation necessitated a quick exit in March, 1994.  The launch and outcome of the 
intervention paralleled those of the Bay of Pigs crisis.  Once again, a policy initiated in 
the final days of an outgoing administration dominated the first few months of a new 
administration.  Once again, presidential attention was deflected from the crisis by the 
dysfunctional forces at work during the transition period.  Once again, the dynamics of 
the transition, combined with multiple intervening variables, led to a policy 
miscalculation and disastrous consequences.  The striking parallels between these two 
crises demonstrate the prominence of transitional dysfunction in American foreign policy 
and further highlight the danger that this period poses to future administrations.   
 In the following sections, I will give a brief overview of the crisis.  I will then use 
the transitional framework introduced earlier to analyze the role of the transition period in 
the crisis.  Finally, I will look at how these limitations relate to existing analyses of the 
crisis.  These existing analyses focus on the prominent influence of Congress as well as 
the role of bureaucratic politics and the principal agent problem.  The bureaucratic 
politics analyses focus on the conflicting goals of different government departments 
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during the operation.  Analyses using the principal agent problem examine how the 
mission in Somalia evolved based on the decisions of agents in the field without the 
oversight of those in charge of the operation.  Both of these relationships will be 
explained using the transitional model discussed in the previous chapters.   
Overview of the Somalia Intervention 
 The humanitarian crisis that sparked the intervention had been building since 
Somalia emerged from the colonial period as a fragile and volatile nation.  In the late 
1860s, the Somaliland territory was divided into three parts: the French territory 
surrounding the port of Djibouti, the British territory in the northeast, and the Italian 
territory in the south (Brune, 1998, p. 14).  Not only were these divisions completely 
incompatible with pre-existing clan boundaries, but they also isolated those living in 
Somaliland territories in modern-day Kenya and Ethiopia (Brune, 1998, p. 14).  By 
ignoring firmly entrenched cultural and political dynamics, the colonial divisions laid the 
foundation for years of political strife and civil warfare.  
 By 1960, the British and Italian colonies gained their independence and formed a 
unified state.  Independence, however, did not automatically bring a functioning central 
government.  Brune (1998) explains the cultural and political barriers to forming a 
centralized Somali nation: 
“The state‟s pastoral economy had a subsistence level of living and clans and sub-
clans were not ready for rule by a central government.  Somalia‟s inter-clan 
relations had local ethical rules but lacked an overarching concept of law essential 
to a modern centralized nation.”  (Brune, 1998, p. 14) 
   
The new nation erupted in violence and civil strife as clans struggled for power in the 
new system.  In this chaotic political climate, General Mohammed Siad Barre overthrew 
the Somali government in 1969.  The rebellion was supported by the Soviet Union and 
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his regime embraced Communist ideology (Brune, 1998, p. 14).  This close relationship 
deteriorated when the Soviet Union attempted to extend its influence into Somalia‟s 
neighboring rival, Ethiopia.  Ultimately, the Soviets forced Somalian troops from the 
disputed Ogaden province in Ethiopia (Brune, 1998, p. 14).     
 During the Cold War, American officials closely followed events in Somalia as 
the competition for spheres of influence extended to Africa.  In return for military 
assistance, the Somalis granted the United States access to the northwestern port of 
Berbera.  Berbera‟s proximity to the Persian/Arabian Gulf gave it great geo-strategic 
importance for the American military (Cohen, 2000, p. 197).  This strategic importance 
sharply declined with the end of the Cold War as American relationships overseas shifted 
in the rapidly changing political climate.  Following Iraq‟s invasion of Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia granted a request from the U.S. to build military bases on Saudi soil.  Herman 
Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs between 1989 and 1993 wrote that 
African ports and airfields rapidly went from “primary staging areas” to “backup 
contingency facilities” (Cohen, 2000, p. 203).  With the downgrade came a sharp decline 
in nearly every form of U.S. involvement in Somalia.  Economic aid was reduced from 
$36 million in 1983 to $8.7 million in 1988 and was later completely eliminated by 
President Reagan in 1989 (Brune, 1998, p. 15).  By 1991, the U.S. diplomatic and 
intelligence presence in Somalia had completely evaporated.   
 Meanwhile, conditions in Somalia continued to deteriorate.  During Barre‟s 
regime, he was widely criticized for monopolizing the state‟s limited resources in a war 
with neighboring Ethiopia.  With a failed economy and rampant corruption, Barre faced 
growing criticism.  Uprisings erupted in the spring of 1988 and rebels successfully 
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overthrew the Barre regime on January 26, 1991 (Brune, 1998, p. 15).  Somalia once 
again erupted in chaos as nearly 13 clans and sub-clans fought for control.  Two factions 
rose to the top, led by Generals Mohamed Farah Aideed and Mohamed Ali Mahdi 
(Brune, 1998, p. 17).  Violence between the Aideed and Ali Mahdi factions dominated 
Somalia.  The growing violence soon precipitated an unprecedented humanitarian crisis 
(Natsios, 1997, p. 12).  Cohen explains how food aid became a pawn of the warring 
factions: 
“To stay in business, the armed factions had to generate revenue to pay their 
fighters.  In the general chaos, the main source of income was humanitarian food 
aid.  Much of the armed action was designed to control food, which had 
effectively become the coin of the realm.  Tens of thousands of hungry people 
were thus denied access to food, because the fighting had also disrupted normal 
crop production and food market operations.”  (Cohen, 2000, p. 205)   
 
In March, 1992, the United Nations estimated that over 300,000 Somalis had died and 
3,000 more were dying each day.  Nearly 500,000 were living in refugee camps in Kenya 
or Ethiopia and more than 70 percent of the livestock was dead (Rutherford, 2008, p. 38).  
Andrew Natsios, later appointed Special Coordinator for Somalia Relief by President 
Bush, reported that Somali food prices had inflated by nearly 1,200 percent in just a few 
months (Natsios, 1997, p. 12).  During this period, the United Nations made several 
unsuccessful attempts to broker a cease-fire between the warring factions (Brune, 1998, 
p. 13). 
 Meanwhile, the Bush administration was in the midst of yet another round of 
Middle East Peace talks, following the rapid success of the Persian Gulf War.  Bush had 
recently introduced the idea of a „new world order‟ as justification for U.S. engagement 
in the world.  He argued that aggression must not be allowed to threaten the world 
community, but that the U.S. must protect a „new world order‟ based on peace, security, 
57 
 
freedom and the rule of law (Jones, 2008, p. 537).  As the administration was determining 
the implications of this new commitment, the Somalia crisis began to attract the attention 
of State Department officials.  On March 25, 1992, Assistant Secretary of State Herman 
Cohen declared a state of disaster in Somalia (Woods, 1997, p. 152).  Following Cohen‟s 
disaster declaration, the economic aid that was suspended during the Reagan 
administration was quickly reinstated.  In March, 24,270 metric tons of food aid was sent 
through the International Committee of the Red Cross, followed by 20,000 metric tons 
through the World Food Program in April.  In a matter of weeks, the United States 
became Somalia‟s largest humanitarian donor (Woods, 1997, p. 153).   
 On April 24, 1992, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 751 
which established United Nations Operations in Somalia I or UNOSOM I (Rutherford, 
2008, p. 28).  In the middle of the 1992 presidential campaign, President Bush was facing 
increasing calls from the international community to supplement UNOSOM I with 
American resources.  On August 13, 1992, Bush approved several recommendations 
which dramatically increased American involvement in Somalia.  He launched Operation 
Provide Relief, which flew nearly 2,500 emergency food airlifts to Somalia and refugee 
camps in Kenya.   He offered U.S. transportation to U.N. security forces in Somalia and 
encouraged the U.N. to host a donor conference.  Finally, Bush committed an additional 
145,000 tons of food to Somali aid efforts (Woods, 1997, p. 155). 
 It soon became clear to administration officials that airlifts alone would not 
resolve the crisis.  Cohen explained: 
“Military food airlifts look good, show the flag in a dramatic way, and provide 
needed relief to people in the vicinity of the airports.  But, a single Hercules C-
130 sortie delivers only six tons of food.  In Somalia, ten sorties a day from 
Mombasa barely dented the surface of the food problem.” (Cohen, 2000, p. 210) 
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Officials realized that increased security was needed to allow humanitarian aid to reach 
all regions of the starving nation (Cohen, 2000, p. 210).  The Deputies Committee of the 
National Security Council was charged with developing a strategy to resolve the crisis.  
Immediately following his loss to President-elect Clinton in the November election, 
President Bush reviewed three options presented by the Deputies Committee.  First, the 
United States could continue its support for UNOSOM I – the coalition of United Nations 
forces already working in Somalia.  Second, the United States could substantially 
augment UNOSOM I forces with the addition of U.S. quick reaction forces and a 
mandate to use force.  Finally, the United States could lead a large-scale intervention to 
secure Somalia.  Bush met with the Joint Chiefs on November 25 and selected the last 
option – the most dramatic intervention scenario.  As part of Operation Restore Hope, 
U.S. forces would lead a multinational coalition into Somalia, staying only long enough 
to secure relief operations before withdrawing (Brune, 1998, p. 21).   
 On December 3, the United Nations approved the creation of a U.S. led 
multinational force – Unified Task Force or UNITAF.  U.S. General Joseph P. Hoar was 
appointed commander of the force on December 4 (Brune, 1998, p. 21).  Hoping to avoid 
a prolonged conflict, President Bush assigned very limited goals to the operation.  These 
included gaining control of the Mogadishu port and airfield, deploying coalition security 
forces at strategic locations in the hunger zone, opening roads, and ensuring security for 
humanitarian operations (Woods, 1997, p. 159).  During the operation‟s most active point 
in January, 1993, approximately 25,800 U.S. forces were stationed in Somalia (Johnston 
& Dagne, 1997, p. 196).   
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 Most of the operation‟s limited goals were accomplished a few weeks after 
UNITAF forces arrived in Somalia.  The Mogadishu port was open and humanitarian aid 
was traveling securely across several of the nation‟s highways.  Aideed and Ali Mahdi 
reached a fragile truce and violence was halted in most major cities (Woods, 1997, p. 
159).  Kenneth Rutherford, who worked as a credit union training officer in Somalia in 
1993, describes the transformation: 
“… four months after the U.S. military forces landed in Somalia, the number of 
deaths per day in Bordera dropped from more than 300 in November, 1992 to 
fewer than five in April, and in Mogadishu the price of an AK-47 went from 
under $50 to almost $1,000 because of the weapon searches and confiscations.”  
(Rutherford, 2008, p. 119)       
 
These initial successes were quickly overshadowed as the operation lingered in Somalia 
without a clear policy direction.   
 The Bush administration had defined short-term goals for the operation.  
However, these short term goals were not enough to ensure long-term security for 
Somalia and the Clinton administration struggled to identify a clear directive for future 
intervention.  The debate suffered from a lack of presidential attention and military 
operations continued well beyond the initial withdrawal date (Rutherford, 2008).  
Without a clear directive for future involvement, the mission of the operation shifted 
from restoring order to nation building.  This mission shift became disastrous for the 
effort as U.S. and U.N. forces launched a campaign against clan leader Mohammed Farah 
Aideed.  The peacekeeping force lost legitimacy by choosing sides in the conflict.  On 
October 3, 1993, the administration was shocked by reports of heavy American casualties 
in Somalia.  Eighteen U.S. Army Rangers were killed and 78 were wounded in a battle 
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with General Aideed‟s supporters in Mogadishu (Woods, 1997, p. 165).  Albright 
described the dismay of administration officials who felt blindsided by this outcome: 
“I was appalled.  In our meetings we talked about what had happened and why.  
At home, at night, I questioned every aspect of what we had done.  I had been part 
of the decision that had led to this.  What had we done wrong?  It was a 
nightmare.”  (Albright, 2003, p. 182)       
 
A national outcry instantly erupted in response to the casualty reports.  President Clinton 
responded on October 7, 1993 by announcing the complete withdrawal of all U.S. troops 
by March 31, 1994 (Brune, 1998, p. 33).  Withdrawal of the U.N. troops followed in 
March of 1995 after peacekeeping efforts collapsed without U.S. support (Brune, 1998, p. 
33).  In the following sections, I will look at how presidential decision-making during the 
crisis was dominated by the same three transitional forces that ensured the failure of the 
Bay of Pigs policy: ambiguity, the holdover effect, and inexperience.   
Transitional Limitations: Ambiguity 
During the transition period, executive leadership and momentum are often 
replaced with ambiguity and inaction.  Outgoing administrations are crippled by the 
„lame duck‟ phenomenon.  Foreign governments and domestic constituents sense the 
futility of an administration with only a short time remaining in office.  However, 
incoming presidents cannot constitutionally govern until sworn into office on January 20.  
As previously discussed, this creates a void in presidential leadership that is especially 
prevalent in times of crisis.  Transitional ambiguity can be observed during the Somalia 
intervention in two ways.  First, the Bush administration did not devote full attention to 
the crisis until after the presidential campaign ended.  Also, the Bush administration 
failed to adequately consider long-term consequences of the policy, leaving the next 
administration with nearly impossible choices.  The absence of presidential attention 
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during the Bush administration mirrors the transitional inattention observed in the Bay of 
Pigs crisis discussed in the previous chapter. 
First, I will examine how the transition period and accompanying presidential 
campaign severely limited the response of the Bush administration as the humanitarian 
crisis in Somalia was gaining international attention.  This lapse in presidential attention 
resulted from both structural and political factors.  Structurally, the re-election campaign 
deprived the administration of time and resources that could have been devoted to the 
growing list of international crises.  In the late summer of 1992, there was a growing 
consensus that immediate action was needed to save lives in Somalia and that only the 
United States had the means necessary to accomplish such an action.  Articles appeared 
in The New York Times and The Washington Post respectively entitled “The Hell Called 
Somalia” and “Bush, UN Face Pressure to Aid War-Torn Somalia.”  A Senate resolution 
passed in both houses on July 31 called for support of food aid delivery in Somalia.  At 
the end of July, President Bush instructed the State Department to be “forward-leaning” 
on Somalia (Rutherford, 2008, p. 43). 
Just after this instruction, and in the midst of multiple other international crises in 
the Middle East, Haiti, and Yugoslavia, President Bush dismantled the highest levels of 
the State Department in a last-minute attempt to salvage his struggling presidential 
campaign.  On August 13, he appointed Secretary of State James Baker as White House 
Chief of Staff with a mandate to run the White House and direct the final months of 
Bush‟s presidential campaign (Rosenthal, 1992).  Moving with Baker to the White House 
were four of his top aides from State including State Department spokeswoman Margaret 
Tutwiler who was named White House Communications Director and Undersecretary of 
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State for Economic Affairs Robert B. Zoellick who took over as Deputy Chief of Staff.  
At the time, New York Times reporter Andrew Rosenthal commented that Bush had, 
“gutted the top ranks of the State Department,” (Rosenthal, 1992).  Deputy Secretary of 
State Lawrence Eagleburger was named Acting Secretary of State and was left to 
reassemble the department with only five months remaining in the administration.   
The shift uprooted policies and procedures that had guided the State Department 
for nearly four years.  Robert Gallucci, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military 
Affairs later reported that he had no idea how to get his proposal for a Somalia 
intervention to Acting Secretary Eagleburger.  In the absence of established policies, 
Gallucci sent his proposal to Eagleburger‟s assistant, who shared it with Eagleburger, 
who later discussed it with President Bush (Rutherford, 2008, p. 72).  Eagleburger later 
noted his reaction to Gallucci‟s proposal, “It was the two memos from Gallucci that got 
me focused.  Until that time, I was not really focused on it.” (Eagleburger quoted in 
Rutherford, 2008, p. 72).  This proposal prompted President Bush‟s November 
conversation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff where he initiated UNITAF operations in 
Somalia.  Due to the pressures of the campaign, all of this occurred outside of State 
Department procedures with inexperienced personnel. 
The lapse in presidential attention was also the result of political pressures from 
the campaign.  As a presidential candidate, Bill Clinton painted his opponent as overly 
focused on foreign affairs and ignorant of domestic issues.  Several administration 
officials noted that this campaign issue delayed Bush‟s response to the Somalia crisis.  
Richard Clarke, the National Security Council‟s Director of International Programs said 
later, “There was no way Bush was going to make a decision for U.S. forces to intervene 
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during the campaign,” (Clarke quoted in Rutherford, 2008, p. 54).  Clarke acknowledged 
the concern that intervening in Somalia would validate Clinton‟s accusations (Rutherford, 
2008, p. 66).  In this way, the campaign deprived the Bush administration of the political 
will to intervene in Somalia until after the election, leaving very little time to formulate a 
clear policy directive for the intervention. 
Transitional ambiguity can also be observed in the Bush administration‟s 
inadequate consideration for the long-range consequences of the intervention.  As 
previously discussed, the Bush administration outlined detailed short-term goals for the 
operation which were achieved shortly after U.S. forces arrived in Somalia.  Further 
planning, however, was limited by the brief time that the Bush administration remained 
in office after the operation was launched.  Planning only began in earnest after the 
November election, when Bush had less than three months remaining in office.  With 
limited time and a limited mandate to govern, the Bush administration failed to analyze 
how these short-term goals would fit into a longer-range plan.   
The administration‟s short-sightedness began from the earliest conversations of a 
possible intervention.  President Bush even entertained the unrealistic possibility that the 
operation could be completed before Clinton assumed office on January 20, 1993.  In his 
memoirs, Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Somalia 
intervention, details a conversation in the Oval Office with Vice-President Dick Cheney 
and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft just after Thanksgiving, 1992 when 
President Bush decided to proceed with the military operation:   
“I like it,” the President said after I finished.  “We‟ll do it.”  Brent Scowcroft 
looked uneasy.  “Sure, we can get in,” he said.  “But how do we get out?”  “We‟ll 
do it and try to be out by January 19,” the President concluded.  “I don‟t want to 
stick Clinton with an ongoing military operation.”  Cheney and I eyed each other.  
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“Mr. President,” Dick said, “we can‟t have it both ways.  We can‟t get in there 
fully until mid-December.  And the job won‟t be done by January 19.”  I 
appreciated that Dick had spoken up, since after January 20 I would be the only 
one in the room left holding this particular bag.”   
(Powell, 1995, p. 565) 
 
Powell‟s account suggests that nearly everyone in the Bush administration aside from the 
president recognized the incongruence of a “quick exit” strategy.  Henry Kissinger, 
former Secretary of State, even publicly suggested that Somali warlords should take 
advantage of the administration‟s short-sightedness by pausing their power struggle until 
after the planned U.S. withdrawal (Brune, 1998, p. 21).  With only a few months 
remaining in office, however, these concerns were deferred to the next administration.   
The administration also deferred warnings of the long-range consequences of a 
proposed intervention.  In an analysis of U.S. decision-making during the Somalia 
intervention, Woods examines the administration‟s response to a memo by Kenyan 
Ambassador Smith Hempstone that contained sharp warnings about the long-range 
hazards of an intervention.  In characteristically sharp language, Hempstone wrote,  
“If you liked Beirut, you‟ll love Mogadishu … The Somali is treacherous.  The 
Somali is a killer.  The Somali is as tough as his country and just as unforgiving.  
The one “beneficial” effect a major American intrusion into Somalia is likely to 
have may be to reunite the Somali nation against us, the invaders, the outsiders, 
the kaffirs who may have fed their children, but also have killed their young 
men.”  (Hempstone quoted in Rutherford, 2008, p. 80) 
 
Woods suggests that long-range concerns such as these were not simply overlooked, but 
were deliberately deferred to the incoming administration: 
“The sharpness of the Washington response, I believe, had … more to do with the 
nagging doubt that not only was he possibly right, but, in particular, he should not 
be raising problems that could be, should be, left to the incoming administration 
and to the UN.  The silencing of Hempstone and other doubters at this early point 
in the drama was mainly a decision, by reflex, to kick those basic concerns 
downstream to those who would later be responsible.”  (Woods, 1997, p. 169) 
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Given the need for U.S. involvement in previous U.N. interventions, the Bush 
administration had no reason to believe that U.N. forces would be able to take over 
security of Somalia after a U.S. withdrawal (Brune, 1998, p. 20).  Despite this, the Bush 
administration did not have a plan for what would happen after UNITAF forces left 
Somalia.  This lapse in long-range planning left the Clinton administration with an 
operation that was unsustainable considering the deteriorating situation in Somalia and 
the inadequate strength of U.N. forces. Once again, ambiguity from the transition period 
limited presidential oversight and critical analysis of an extensive military operation.     
 In this case, the danger of transitional ambiguity was magnified by the political 
dynamics surrounding the outgoing administration.  Unlike the Eisenhower 
administration that departed after two full terms in office, the Bush administration was 
voted out of office.  Expecting another four years to achieve their goals, the 
administration was left with only a few months to shape President Bush‟s legacy.  
Several observers have suggested that this dynamic provided incentive for the 
administration to launch an ambitious military operation with inadequate time, resources, 
or policy direction.  Prior to losing the election, the Bush administration demonstrated 
reluctance to engage in further humanitarian operations.  In addition to running arrears on 
U.N. dues, the United States had just devoted over $2 billion for peacekeeping costs in 
Cambodia (Rutherford, 2008, p. 21).  Former Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen 
described the trend as “disaster fatigue” (Cohen, 2000, p. 207).  The decision to intervene 
in Somalia sharply contrasted this trend.   
Analysts have suggested that the Bush administration used the Somalia operation 
as an opportunity to salvage Bush‟s legacy during the remaining months in office.  
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Stevenson describes the operation as “sure-fire redemption, for the sake of the Bush 
administration‟s place in history,” (Stevenson, 1995, p. xii) and Brune (1998) wrote that 
the intervention, “may have been his (Bush‟s) final attempt to demonstrate U.S. support 
for a new world order.” (Brune, 1998, p. 13)  National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft 
described the intervention as an opportunity to disprove critics who claimed that the Bush 
administration failed to intervene in Bosnia because it was a Muslim country.  He noted,  
“…for me, Somalia gave us the ability to show they were wrong … It was a 
Southern hemisphere state; it was black; it was non-Christian; it was everything 
that epitomized the Third World.”  (Scowcroft quoted in Rutherford, 2008, p. 
181) 
 
Voted out of office, many in the Bush administration viewed the Somalia crisis as their 
only remaining opportunity to send a message to the world.  This mindset was an impetus 
for launching an ambitious military operation that did not have the resources or mandate 
to ensure security in Somalia for longer than a few weeks or months.  These political 
dynamics heightened the dangers of transitional ambiguity and left the Clinton 
administration with a short-sighted policy that failed to consider future consequences.  
Transitional Limitations: Holdover Effect 
As previously discussed, policies and initiatives do not come to a neat conclusion 
at the end of a presidential term.  This trend is especially prevalent in the realm of 
international politics which continues unabated despite domestic circumstances.  The 
holdover effect observed during the Bay of Pigs crisis was also at work during the 
Somalia intervention and created a chain reaction of policy mismanagement.  The policy, 
which was carried over from the Bush administration, proved incompatible with the 
priorities of the new Clinton administration.  This resulted in a lack of presidential 
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attention which led to a transfer of decision-making to lower level officials and the 
absence of executive oversight.   
During the Somalia intervention, the changing dynamics of post-Cold War 
politics magnified the impact of the holdover effect.  In the absence of the Cold War 
threat, significant foreign policy differences developed between the two American 
political parties.  No longer were the two parties united against a common enemy.  The 
unifying focus dissolved with the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Debates intensified over 
the appropriate focus of American foreign policy and the appropriate level of American 
involvement in world affairs.  During the presidential campaign, Clinton seized upon the 
isolationist mindset that was growing in the American public in the wake of the Cold 
War.  He repeatedly criticized Bush for his level of involvement overseas.  Clinton 
suggested that Bush was preoccupied with foreign affairs, neglecting domestic policy and 
leading the country to an economic recession (Rutherford, 2008, p. 66).   
Clinton‟s focus on domestic affairs did not waver after he assumed office on 
January 20.  As President-elect, Clinton was not opposed to the intervention.  In fact, he 
expressed his support for the operation several times during the transition period.  After 
losing the November election, the Bush administration made a concerted effort to keep 
Clinton‟s team apprised of plans in Somalia.  Admiral David Jeremiah, who served as 
deputy to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was dispatched to brief Clinton and 
his advisors on the military operation.  As President-elect, Clinton endorsed Bush‟s plan 
to send forces to Somalia (Woods, 1997, p. 158).  Despite this public support, the 
intervention became incompatible with the priorities of the Clinton administration as 
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Clinton and his team focused on other areas.  Ultimately, the Clinton administration was 
not able to shoulder the burden assumed by their predecessors.     
The Somalia intervention suffered from a lack of executive oversight as the White 
House, State Department, and Defense Departments all focused on other priorities.  
Clinton was elected with a mandate to end the economic recession and focus on domestic 
conditions.  Throughout his presidency, he was most comfortable in the domestic realm.  
In a compilation of foreign policy documents during the Clinton presidency, Rubinstein, 
Shayevich & Zlotnikov explain that Clinton‟s discomfort in the realm of foreign affairs 
did not go unnoticed:  
“Smart, articulate, impressively informed, and energetically involved as Clinton 
could be on domestic matters, he seemed unfocused, almost unengaged, and ad 
hoc in his response to foreign policy issues.  Critics lamented the absence of a 
coherent vision or strategic outlook.”  (Rubinstein, Shayevich & Zlotnikov, 2000, 
p. 4) 
 
In his earliest days in office, Clinton was focused on a new economic plan to reduce the 
federal deficit.  He established the National Economic Council and pledged to reform 
health care within the first 100 days of his administration (Jones, 2008).  Clinton‟s team 
was also preoccupied with his campaign pledge to remove the ban on gays serving in the 
military (Powell, 1995, p. 571).   
Overwhelmed by a number of international crises, the new State Department was 
unable to fully compensate for the president‟s inattention.  State Department officials 
were consumed by relations with China, political instability in Haiti, and a burgeoning 
crisis in Liberia (Rutherford, 2008, p. 105).  American officials were also still adapting to 
the increased variety of threats presented by the post-Cold War world.  In a speech at 
American University on February 26, 1993, Clinton described the new challenges: 
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“The change confronting us in the 1990‟s is in some ways more difficult than 
previous times because it is less distinct.  It is more complex and in some ways 
the path is less clear to most of our people still today …” (Clinton quoted in 
Rubinstein et al., 2000, p. 9) 
 
Strategies of containment, deterrence, and détente no longer applied after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union.  The United States was still adapting to its role as a unipolar power.  
Without the rubric of Cold War alliances, the geopolitical significance of world events 
was becoming increasingly difficult to predict.  The intervention in Somalia became lost 
in the transition as State Department officials struggled to adapt to their new roles in a 
new world.   
Meanwhile, the Defense Department was consumed with a “Bottom-Up Review” 
initiated by Defense Secretary Les Aspin immediately after his appointment.  Determined 
to reform the Defense Department, Aspin ordered a review of all Defense Department 
activities.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell describes the scope of the 
review:  
“Theoretically BUR meant starting with a clean slate, as if the current armed 
forces did not exist, and then building a new force to match current defense 
missions.  This approach had a test-tube reasonableness, except that instead of 
starting from scratch, the new administration had inherited existing strategies, 
forces, treaty obligations, commitments, and crises all around the world.”  
(Powell, 1995, p. 579) 
 
Aspin‟s comprehensive review consumed the department.  As Powell suggests, it 
prevented Defense Department officials from adequately engaging in existing military 
operations that required oversight.  It wasn‟t until August of 1993 that Aspin devoted 
resources to the crisis, asking his staff for a viable strategy for success in Somalia 
(Woods, 1997, p. 163).  By this time, however, the intervention had spiraled out of 
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control.  Woods (1997) argues that the Aspin strategy could have improved the chaos in 
Somalia if initiated earlier:  
“Had there been time and a U.S. commitment to vigorously assist the UN to 
pursue the broad Aspin agenda, the unfavorable drift of events might yet have 
been reversed … But even as efforts to implement this agenda proceeded, the 
orders to the Rangers stood; the hunt for Aideed was being intensified, and the 
possibility of having time to pursue the Aspin agenda was about to be 
extinguished.”  (Woods, 1997, p. 164) 
 
Critical analysis of the military operation should have been initiated within the 
Department of Defense at the start of the Clinton administration.  However, the 
department‟s time and resources were monopolized by the Bottom-up Review.  Like the 
State Department, the Defense Department was consumed by the demands of the 
transition and was unable to fill the void of executive leadership.       
 In the absence of executive oversight, most policy decisions during the crisis were 
made by the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council (Woods, 1997, p. 
160).  Secretary of State Warren Christopher later admitted that the work of the Deputies 
Committee protected administration officials from engaging in the Somalia intervention 
(Stevenson, 1995, p. 92).  Admiral Jeremiah also later agreed that the administration 
devoted inadequate attention to the crisis.  In a report commissioned by the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff to evaluate the crisis, Walter S. Poole reported Jeremiah‟s analysis of the 
situation: 
“In Jeremiah‟s view, the White House kept operating for some time in a campaign 
mode, skeptical about the views of officials carried over from the Bush 
administration and of those who had not been on the election team.  Partly as a 
result, he believed, the US government never committed enough resources to 
UNOSOM II.”  (Poole, 2005, p. 39) 
 
This disconnect between executive decisions and executive officials left the Clinton 
administration woefully uninformed about the details of the operation until it began to 
71 
 
unravel in the fall of 1993.  Meanwhile, the mission of the operation in Somalia reflected 
the lack of attention and oversight as it drifted from unsustainable to crisis point. 
Transitional Limitations: Inexperience 
Transitional ambiguity and the holdover effect do not fully explain the role of the 
transition period during the Somalia intervention.  Another major factor was the 
inexperience of President Clinton and his team in dealing with crises and decisions at the 
presidential level.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the effectiveness of the new 
Kennedy administration was limited because his administration followed 8 years of 
Republican control of the White House.  During the Bush/Clinton transition, this problem 
was magnified.  Clinton became the first Democratic president in twelve years, following 
two Republican administrations.  This time lapse magnified the limiting factor of 
inexperience during the first year of Clinton‟s term.  Inexperience led to three shortfalls 
during the mismanagement of the Somalia intervention: the absence of qualified 
personnel, the use of untested decision-making procedures, and a dramatic miscalculation 
of U.N. expectations and capabilities.   
First, the presidential transition resulted in a sudden lack of qualified officials to 
provide critical analysis during the crisis.  Between the Kennedy and Clinton 
administrations, the growing complexity of American foreign policy had dramatically 
increased the number of presidential appointees by almost 400 percent (Campbell & 
Steinberg, 2008, p. 37).  The twelve year gap between Democratic administrations added 
to the challenge of finding qualified people to fill administration posts.  Long nomination 
and confirmation delays exacerbated the problem.  Clinton announced all Cabinet level 
nominations before Christmas in 1992 (Drew, 1994, p.33).  Other mid-to-upper level 
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foreign policy positions remained unfilled as Clinton‟s primary focus was domestic 
affairs.  Adding to the delay was the record-setting duration of Senate confirmations for 
Clinton‟s nominees.  The Brookings Institution reported that it took the Senate an average 
of 41 days to confirm Clinton‟s nominees in 1993, an increase of 37% longer than the 
average confirmation of Reagan‟s nominees in 1981 (Loomis, 2001).   
Most officials, even in the highest posts, lacked experience and confidence at the 
presidential level.  U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (who would later succeed 
Warren Christopher as Secretary of State in the Clinton administration) described herself 
as “new on the job and eager to earn my place as a full member of our foreign policy 
team” (Albright, 2003, p. 179).  As with any new administration, Clinton‟s team had not 
yet learned to work with each other and within the larger government bureaucracy.  The 
new officials examined foreign policy decisions using procedures that were untested in a 
crisis situation.  As previously discussed, other transitional pressures pushed the Somalia 
intervention from the desks of top administration officials to the Deputies Committee of 
the National Security Council.  In a report commissioned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 
study the strategic failure of the Somalia intervention, Walter S. Poole noted that 
“imprecision and drift seemed to reign,” at these meetings (Poole, 2005, p. 4).   
Decision-making procedures did not improve even when discussions did reach the 
highest levels of the administration.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, 
who served under the Bush administration, stayed in his post during the first 9 months of 
the Clinton administration to complete his term.  He described his frustration with early 
policy meetings in the Clinton White House: 
“…the discussions continued to meander like graduate-student bull sessions or the 
think-tank seminars in which many of my new colleagues had spent the last 
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twelve years while their party was out of power.  Backbenchers sounded off with 
the authority of cabinet officers.  I was shocked one day to hear one of Tony 
Lake‟s subordinates, who was there to take notes, argue with him in front of the 
rest of us.”  (Powell, 1995, p. 576)     
 
President Clinton‟s leadership style failed to resolve the growing policy uncertainty in the 
realm of foreign affairs.  This unstructured and informal foreign policy decision making 
process would continue to challenge the administration well into the second term.  As 
previously discussed, Clinton preferred to focus on domestic and economic issues.  His 
team was expected to handle foreign policy so that he could focus on domestic affairs 
(Hyland, 1999).  This lack of structure exacerbated the challenges of entering the White 
House and left the administration without a clear foreign policy vision or purpose, as 
evidenced by the Somalia intervention.   
In the absence of effective decision-making procedures, Clinton‟s team failed to 
clearly articulate their strategy in Somalia.  The inability to effectively communicate was 
most prominent in the weeks before the battle with Aideed‟s forces in Mogadishu.  It was 
becoming increasingly clear to administration officials that they had miscalculated the 
strength of Aideed‟s militia and the support he enjoyed within Somalia (Johnston, 1997, 
p. 199).  The Clinton administration was also beginning to question Howe‟s focus on 
capturing Aideed.  In the weeks prior to the Mogadishu battle, Secretary of Defense Les 
Aspin began referencing an exit strategy and discussions turned to a diplomatic solution 
(Poole, 2005, p. 3).  Officials, however, failed to communicate this change to military 
officers on the ground in Somalia.  The communication failure resulted from the 
ineffective decision-making procedures established early in the operation.  In his Joint 
Chiefs report, Poole explained that policy shifts lost their emphasis as they were filtered 
through the Deputies Committee:  
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“Secretary of Defense Aspin spoke of devising an “exit strategy” from Somalia; 
the Joint Chiefs also started working out a course of action.  But, policy 
adjustments by the Deputies Committee were so finely nuanced that lower 
echelons did not interpret them as major changes and field commanders could not 
translate them into concrete actions.”  (Poole, 2005, p. 3) 
 
Secretary Aspin further muddied the situation when he discussed the administration‟s 
policy in Somalia during a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 
August.  In his remarks, Aspin referenced efforts to find a diplomatic solution while 
simultaneously affirming the administration‟s commitment to capturing Aideed 
(Rutherford, 2008, p. 153).  Had the administration devoted adequate attention to their 
Somalia policy, they may have realized that these goals were incompatible.  The 
incoherency of the administration‟s position reached a climax in September, 1993 when 
U.S. Army General Thomas Montgomery requested additional artillery for his units 
serving in Somalia.  Aspin denied the request, citing the administration‟s renewed focus 
on a diplomatic solution (Rutherford, 2008, p. 156).  Rutherford describes the 
implications of this decision.  These implications were unobserved by administration 
officials:  
“The administration started backing away from the military option by withholding 
support for its troops but without giving them the command to stop the attacks or 
informing them that the diplomatic option had already been adopted.  Aspin‟s 
decision to turn down Montgomery‟s request highlighted the impossibility of the 
two-track policy – continuing military operations without support for the field, 
and a tentative decision to go diplomatic that was implemented only in 
Washington, D.C.”  (Rutherford, 2008, p. 138) 
        
After American casualties in Mogadishu a few months later, Aspin was heavily 
criticized for declining Montgomery‟s request.  Officials later determined that additional 
artillery would not have prevented the October casualties (Rutherford, 2008, p. 138).  
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However, the decision does exemplify the policy uncertainty that developed amidst the 
chaos of the transition period.   
The inexperience of the Clinton administration can also be observed in their 
ineffective coordination with the United Nations.  Throughout the intervention, the 
Clinton administration dramatically misinterpreted the expectations of the U.N. and 
overestimated their capabilities.  Before entering office, President Bush had extensive 
experience with the United Nations, even serving as the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. 
under the Nixon administration.  Bush also had the benefit of three years as a global 
leader in the changing international community.  Despite the failure of short-sightedness 
discussed earlier, the Bush administration did establish clear boundaries between U.S. 
and U.N. responsibilities.  Embracing the misguided concept that the U.N. could function 
independently with an operation at this level, the Clinton administration was not as 
vigilant in enforcing this boundary.  This was exemplified in the confusion between the 
U.N. and the Clinton administration over the issue of disarmament.   
Bush administration officials drafted U.N. Security Council Resolution 794 which 
authorized the U.S.-led mission in Somalia.  Reacting to Congressional concerns that this 
was a police action rather than a humanitarian program, these officials deliberately 
avoided mentioning a disarmament program.  Woods explains that Bush administration 
officials viewed disarmament as a critical issue in the U.S./U.N. relationship:  
“From Washington‟s perspective, this constant reaffirmation of the limited nature 
of UNITAF responsibilities was also necessary to fend off continuous efforts by 
the UN to get UNITAF to do what Washington felt should properly be left to the 
follow-on UN forces themselves.”  (Woods, 1997, p. 161)  
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Additionally, strategists within the U.S. military saw disarmament in Somalia as 
unrealistic because of the value Somalis placed on individual security and gun ownership 
(Poole, 2005, p. 2).   
This caution was lost, however, in the absence of executive oversight during the 
transition.  UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali insisted that U.S. forces participate in 
disarmament efforts and the Clinton administration was not engaged enough to resist.  
U.S. forces gradually became more involved in disarmament efforts, even to the point of 
searching private homes for weapons and raiding arms markets (Lyons & Samatar, 1995, 
p. 42). On May 19, 1993, President Clinton even expressed support for a “program to 
collect heavy weapons” in an effort to clarify long-range goals for the intervention.  The 
Clinton administration, without a clear understanding of Somali culture or U.N. 
capabilities, had casually removed one of the safeguards against extended U.S. 
involvement.  In addition to further blurring the line between U.S. and U.N. 
responsibilities, this foray into disarmament intensified public animosity toward the 
United States and reinforced public support for General Aideed leading up to the October 
confrontation in Mogadishu.     
All of these problems stemmed from the inexperience of the new administration.  
In the midst of multiple international crises, the administration lacked the personnel, 
decision-making structures, or skills necessary to effectively formulate policy.    
Applying the Transitional Limitations Model to Existing Analyses 
 As explained above, the transitional problems of ambiguity, inexperience, and 
holdover policies limited presidential leadership during the Somalia crisis.  Existing 
analyses of the Somalia crisis identify multiple causes for the policy failure in Somalia.  
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Among the causes discussed are bureaucratic uncertainty leading to mission drift and the 
prominent role of Congressional advocacy.  Existing analyses point to these factors as the 
primary causes of policy failure.  I will argue that these analyses are incomplete.  
Bureaucratic uncertainty and Congressional advocacy are both inherent in the American 
democratic system and do not independently cause policy miscalculation.  Rather, these 
factors are secondary causes that were only allowed to replace presidential leadership 
because of the policy uncertainty (presidential indecision and inattention) surrounding a 
presidential transition.   The transitional limitations of ambiguity, inexperience, and the 
holdover effect created a power vacuum which allowed other forces to dominate 
presidential decision making. Similar to the Bay of Pigs crisis, miscalculations during the 
Somalia intervention follow the causal relationship illustrated below:  
Transitional Limitations                    X                           Miscalculation 
  Independent Variable     Intervening Variable                 Dependent Variable 
 
During the Somalia intervention, the intervening variables at work included bureaucratic 
politics, especially the principal agent problem, and Congressional advocacy.  In the 
following sections, I will examine how these causal factors offer a more complete 
explanation of the Somalia crisis when examined within the context of the presidential 
transition period.   
Overview of Bureaucratic Politics 
 Bureaucratic politics is the study of how the inner workings of bureaucracies 
impact both the creation and implementation of foreign policy (Krieger, 2001, p. 95).  As 
discussed in the Bay of Pigs analysis, theories of bureaucratic politics can be divided into 
two categories.  First, bureaucratic politics theorists argue that bureaucrats will take 
different stances on an issue because of the department they represent.  Other theories 
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focus on the argument that foreign policy decisions do not represent one voice, but the 
maneuvering and compromises of different bureaucratic systems.  The latter category of 
bureaucratic politics has been suggested as a cause for both of the transitional crises 
discussed in this paper: the Bay of Pigs crisis and the Somalia intervention.  This striking 
parallel reinforces the necessity of strong executive leadership to direct bureaucratic 
impulses into coherent policy. 
 In a report published by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Walter S. Poole 
examines the conditions and circumstances that led President Bush to intervene in 
Somalia, as well as the circumstances which eventually necessitated a quick withdrawal.  
Poole‟s report argues that conflicting objectives of the State and Defense Departments led 
to imprecision and drift which ultimately undermined the success of the Somalia 
intervention (Poole, 2005, p. 4).  His account reveals that conflicts between the State and 
Defense Departments raged throughout the operation‟s development and implementation.  
From the earliest discussions of a possible intervention, State Department officials argued 
that only U.S. forces were capable of resolving the crisis and saving lives in Somalia.  
Members of the Defense Department countered that such involvement constituted a long-
term commitment that the United States could not afford to uphold.  Poole describes an 
exchange between Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen and Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Robert Wolthuis during a meeting of the Policy Coordinating 
Committee on Somalia in August, 1992 that illustrates this debate: 
“Mr. Robert Wolthuis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Global Affairs) 
reminded conferees that Operation PROVIDE COMFORT aiding the Kurds in 
Northern Iraq, already had taken more than $1 billion from Defense‟s budget.  
But every time the conferees started talking about specifics and limitations upon 
Defense assets, Cohen would interrupt, „Remember, people are dying.‟”  (Poole, 
2005, p. 9)   
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Cohen‟s own account of the intervention supports Poole‟s assertion that the early 
discussions were consumed by conflicts between the State and Defense Departments.  In 
Intervening in Africa, Cohen describes negativism from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Defense Department about the Somalia intervention which led to a stalemated 
bureaucracy (Cohen, 2000, p. 208). 
 Poole argues that because of this bureaucratic infighting, U.S. objectives in 
Somalia became a “constantly shifting target,” (Poole, 2005, p. 70).  In the absence of 
clearly defined policy goals, the mission gradually shifted from the security of food aid 
delivery to the creation of a viable and functioning nation in Somalia.  This new focus 
was championed by State Department officials.  Madeleine Albright, who served as U.S. 
Ambassador to the U.N. and later Secretary of State, described the new mission of the 
Clinton administration: 
“We will embark on the unprecedented enterprise aimed at nothing less than the 
restoration of an entire country as a proud, functioning and viable member of the 
community of nations.”  (Hyland, 1999, p.56)   
 
This statement represented a dramatic shift in the scope and duration of the intervention.  
In June of 1993, the intervention‟s objectives took another dramatic turn, this time led by 
Defense officials.  On June 17, Admiral Howe issued a warrant for the arrest of General 
Aideed, complete with a $25,000 reward for his capture (Poole, 2005, p. 3).  Bureaucratic 
conflicts continued through the final weeks before the Mogadishu battle when State 
Department officials began searching for a diplomatic solution amidst ongoing military 
operations.  The events of October 3 shifted the objective in Somalia once again.  The 
public outcry over American casualties in Mogadishu was finally enough to prompt 
presidential attention.  The Clinton administration abandoned all other goals in Somalia 
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and worked towards an immediate exit.  Poole argued that the operation failed because it 
followed the changing whims of different bureaucratic departments (Poole, 2005, p. 70). 
 In Humanitarianism Under Fire, Kenneth Rutherford‟s analysis of the targeted 
search for Aideed reveals another facet of bureaucratic politics at work during the crisis – 
the principal agent problem.  The principal agent problem occurs when a subordinate acts 
without the direction or even knowledge of superiors.  As in the Bay of Pigs crisis, the 
absence of executive leadership allowed subordinates to direct policy without direction or 
explicit approval from superiors.  Admiral Howe‟s arrest warrant on General Aideed was 
supported by Boutros-Ghali and the United Nations, but took the Defense Department by 
surprise (Brune, 1998, p. 30).  Howe‟s previous request for American Special Forces to 
hunt Aideed was initially denied by Secretary Aspin on June 9 (Rutherford, 2008, p. 
134).  While Chairman Powell eventually granted Howe‟s request for additional gunships 
and strike planes to attack Somali strongholds, he continued to resist proposals to hunt 
Aideed.  Defense Department reluctance was overpowered on June 13, however, after 
Somali civilians were killed during a violent altercation between Aideed‟s forces and 
U.N. Peacekeepers.  Howe responded quickly by issuing a warrant for Aideed‟s arrest 
and a $25,000 reward for his capture.  Rutherford describes how the Defense Department 
was trapped into supporting Howe‟s public verdict: 
“Although the Aidid arrest and reward edict was cleared by UN headquarters, it 
caught Defense Department officials by surprise, but there was little they could 
do.  Posters proclaiming “WANTED Aidid for REWARD of $25,000” were 
displayed in Mogadishu…” (Rutherford, 2008, p. 136) 
 
General Powell and Secretary of Defense Aspin both expressed reservations about 
sending additional troops, but ultimately supported the request from the field, sending 
400 elite U.S. Delta and Ranger forces to Somalia (Brune, 1998, p. 31).  The decision to 
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commit U.S. forces to the hunt for Aideed precipitated the October 3 battle in Mogadishu 
and dealt the final blow to a failing operation.  By advancing conflicting goals and acting 
independently of the presidency, the bureaucracy did exert dominating influence during 
the Somalia intervention.  Existing analyses, however, fail to recognize the role of the 
presidential transition in allowing this influence to emerge.    
Bureaucratic Politics within the Transitional Limitations Model 
 Examining the existing analyses through the Transitional Limitations Model 
offers a more complete analysis of the Somalia intervention.  In this model, transitional 
limitations created the policy uncertainty which allowed bureaucratic forces to dominate 
presidential decision-making. 
 
Transitional Limitations      Bureaucratic Politics             Miscalculation 
 Independent Variable      Intervening Variable         Dependent Variable 
 
Both of the existing bureaucratic politics analyses discussed in the previous section offer 
a clearer explanation of the Bay of Pigs crisis when examined within this model.   
Poole argues that rampant imprecision and bureaucratic infighting prevented 
effective policy-making and facilitated the mission creep from a humanitarian 
intervention to a revenge mission (Poole, 2005, p. 70).  In his analysis, bureaucratic 
imprecision was the independent variable that caused the policy miscalculation.  This 
analysis overlooks an important element of the crisis.  Competing bureaucratic interests 
do not cause policy miscalculations independently.  Despite the fact that bureaucratic 
interests are inherent in the American democratic system, miscalculations on this scale 
represent anomalies in American foreign policy, not the norm.  In fact, bureaucratic 
departments are designed to advance competing interests while the presidency is 
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designed to direct these competing interests into coherent foreign policy.  Halperin & 
Clapp (2006) explain the ideal role of the president in American foreign policy:   
“In any foreign policy decision widely believed at the time to be important, the 
President will almost always be the principal figure determining the general 
direction of actions … Furthermore, the President serves as the surrogate for the 
national interest.  Many senior participants look to the President as to a blueprint 
for clues to the national security.  His perception and judgment of what is in the 
national interest are dominant in the system.  A strong President – with a clear 
sense of direction and leadership – can have a very strong influence on the images 
shared by bureaucratic participants, Congress, and the public.”  (Halperin & 
Clapp, 2006, p. 16)  
 
Bureaucracies were designed to inform and implement American foreign policy, not to 
govern American objectives.  In the American democratic system, one of the primary 
roles of presidential leadership is to represent American interests abroad, with one voice 
that rises above competing domestic agendas.   
Considering the appropriate roles of the bureaucracy and the presidency, Poole‟s 
analysis raises the question of why competing bureaucratic interests were allowed to 
replace presidential leadership, govern foreign policy, and blur American objectives.  The 
Transitional Limitations Model completes Poole‟s analysis of the role of bureaucratic 
politics.  As discussed above, transitional pressures consumed the executive departments 
of the Bush and Clinton administrations, diverting attention from the crisis and allowing 
other factors to dominate presidential decision-making.  Rather than independently 
causing the policy miscalculation, competing bureaucratic interests magnified the policy 
uncertainty created by transitional limitations.  Bureaucratic politics only explains the 
miscalculation of the Somalia intervention within the context of the presidential transition 
period.    
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The Transitional Limitations Model is confirmed by the emergence of the 
principal agent problem during the crisis.  As discussed above, even the bureaucracies 
were consumed by transitional pressures.  The State Department was overwhelmed by 
responding to multiple international crises.  The Defense Department was consumed by 
Aspin‟s “Bottom-up Review.”  With attention diverted elsewhere, one general in the field 
was able to dramatically shift American objectives in Somalia.  This highlights the fact 
that policy uncertainty (presidential indecision and inattention) not bureaucratic interests 
were the cause of the miscalculation in Somalia.  If the Somalia intervention had been 
directed by strong presidential leadership, the actions of one general in the field would 
have represented a minor power struggle, instead of a complete shift in the direction of 
American foreign policy.  Bureaucratic politics emerged as an intervening variable only 
in the absence of presidential attention and leadership.   
Congressional Advocacy 
 Other analyses have focused on the role of congressional advocacy in determining 
the course of the operation in Somalia.  In their discussion on the role of Congress in the 
Somalia intervention, Johnston and Dagne (1997) argue that Congressional influence 
played a critical role in all key points of the intervention: 
“The 102nd (1991-1992 Congress played a crucial role in getting the United States 
to act to save starving Somalis; the Democratic-controlled 103
rd
 Congress (1993-
1994) forced the withdrawal of U.S. troops, a step that resulted in subsequent UN 
withdrawal.”  (Johnston & Dagne, 1997, p. 191) 
 
Johnston & Dagne provide an overview of Congressional activity surrounding the 
Somalia crisis and argue that this activity determined presidential decision-making.  In 
January 1992, two ranking members of the Senate Africa Subcommittee, Senators Paul 
Simon and Nancy Kassebaum, initiated a call for action in Somalia (Woods, 1997, p. 
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152).  Between January and June of 1992, state department officials were called to testify 
before House and Senate committees six times on the Somali crisis (Woods, 1997, p. 
155).  During that same period, members of Congress participated in an extensive letter 
writing campaign to key policymakers including President George Bush and Secretary of 
State James Baker.  Public hearings were also used to focus media attention on the 
growing crisis and several members of Congress even visited Somalia in fact-finding 
delegations (Johnston, 1997, p. 193).  President Bush acknowledged the role of Congress 
in a public letter on December 10 which explained his decision to launch UNITAF 
(Rutherford, 2008).   
Despite their support for U.S. engagement in Somalia, Johnston & Dagne argue 
that the scale of the proposed invasion took members of Congress by surprise.  When the 
103
rd
 Congress was called into session in January, several members questioned whether 
Operation Restore Hope was consistent with the 1973 War Powers Resolution.  Even 
though many members had pushed for U.S. engagement, they criticized President Bush 
for initiating and President Clinton for supporting a military operation of this scale 
without congressional approval (Johnston, 1997, p. 200).  In July 1993, Senator Robert 
Byrd (D – W.V.) registered his criticism on the Senate floor: 
“I do not remember voting to grant the U.S. military the authority to chase down 
competing African warlords and conduct house-to-house searches in Mogadishu 
to confiscate weapons.”  (Byrd quoted in Johnston & Dagne, 1997, p. 198)   
 
On October 3, reports of American casualties in Mogadishu spurred a bipartisan push for 
immediate withdrawal.  After extensive debate and a critical compromise with Senator 
Byrd, Congressional leaders in both parties supported the White House‟s withdrawal 
deadline of March 31, 1994.  Johnston and Dagne argue that the Clinton administration‟s 
85 
 
failure to address the concerns of Congressional leaders eventually forced this 
withdrawal.    
Congressional Advocacy within the Transitional Limitations Model  
 Johnston and Dagne‟s analysis highlights an important variable at work during the 
Somalia intervention, but it ignores critical dynamics that shaped presidential decision-
making and Congressional action during the crisis.  Similar to Poole‟s bureaucratic 
politics analysis, this analysis overlooks the appropriate roles of Congress and the 
Presidency.  Congressional influence can certainly be observed during the crisis, but it 
does not function as an independent variable.  Rather, congressional advocacy was 
allowed to emerge as a dominant force during the intervention because of transitional 
pressures on the executive department.  This relationship is explained using the 
Transitional Limitations Model.   
Transitional Limitations  Congressional Advocacy  Miscalculation 
 Independent Variable             Intervening Variable                 Dependent Variable 
 
During the intervention, transitional limitations created policy uncertainty (presidential 
indecision and inattention) which allowed congressional advocacy to exert influence on 
presidential decision-making.  Ultimately, the miscalculation was caused by transitional 
uncertainty, while the details of that miscalculation were shaped by congressional 
advocacy and other intervening variables.   
 In Who Rules the Roost? (2002), Andrew Bennett examines the relationship of 
Congress and the Executive in American foreign policy.  Bennett argues that the foreign 
policy is at its best when the two branches work together, relying on their respective 
strengths: 
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“Each branch has unique comparative advantages that it can bring to bear to save 
the other branch from its particular form of excess.  The presidency offers the 
possibility of a foreign policy that is decisive, proactive, and when necessary, 
secret, and the Congress offers diversity of opinion, deliberation, democracy, 
openness wherever possible, and consensus building.  The question is whether we 
can achieve a „balance between Congress and the president – a clearer 
identification of the areas where each has a comparative advantage over the other‟ 
(Mann, 1990, p. 4).”  (Bennett, 2002, p. 49)   
 
In an ideal foreign policy relationship between Congress and the Executive, Congress 
acts in an advisory capacity and the President takes decisive action after considering 
multiple sources of opinion.  During the Somalia intervention, transitional limitations 
prevented both branches from fulfilling these ideal roles during both the Bush and 
Clinton administrations.  The Bush administration consulted Congress, but failed to fulfill 
an essential presidential responsibility to consider long-range consequences.  The Clinton 
administration failed to consult Congress, part of a broader absence of presidential 
attention to the entire policy.  In both administrations, Congressional advocacy did not 
drive the policy failure, but only magnified the transitional limitations on presidential 
attention.   
 Congressional advocacy for U.S. engagement in Somalia began building in 
January of 1992.  However, President Bush did not respond to this until after losing the 
election in November of 1992.  As previously discussed, the military operation had long-
range consequences which the Bush administration deferred to the incoming 
administration.  The administration acknowledged Congressional pressure to intervene in 
Somalia, but did not look beyond the few months they had remaining in office.  Bennett 
argues that the need for long-range planning is one of the key reasons why the presidency 
is best equipped to make foreign policy decisions: 
87 
 
“… Presidents have to worry about both policy risk, or the risk that a foreign 
policy will fail to achieve its objectives, and political risk, or the risk of being 
blamed by voters for failures in foreign policy … Members of Congress can 
therefore advance foreign policies that are unrealistic in the international arena 
but popular with voters at home, safe in the knowledge that presidents will either 
oppose these policies or suffer the political blame for policy failure if they adopt 
them.”  (Bennett, 2002, p. 51)     
 
As Bennett suggests, the ultimate responsibility to consider long-range consequences of 
foreign policy decisions rests with the presidency.  Even though Congress advocated for 
an ill-conceived intervention in Somalia, the failure to consider long-range consequences 
is a failure of the presidency, not of Congress.  Congressional advocacy is only an 
intervening variable that magnified the policy uncertainty of a presidential transition.   
 Similarly, Congressional advocacy had only an ancillary effect on the 
miscalculations of the Clinton administration.  Johnston and Dagne argue that the Clinton 
administration‟s failure to address the concerns of Congressional leaders caused the 
policy shifts which undermined initial U.S. success in Somalia.  This analysis overlooks 
the fact that the Clinton administration was just as inattentive to the policy itself as they 
were to Congressional concerns over the policy.  As previously discussed, the Somalia 
intervention was a holdover policy from the Bush administration.  This policy soon 
dropped from the attention of President Clinton and his team as they devoted time and 
resources to the new administration‟s priorities.  Congress did exert influence on 
presidential decision-making after the Mogadishu battle by demanding a quick exit.  
However, this influence was only exerted after American policy in Somalia had been 
completely derailed by presidential inattention and inexperience relating to the transition 
period.  In his memoirs, President Clinton reveals that his decision to follow 
Congressional demands to withdraw in Somalia was driven by other priorities: 
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“Moreover, there was no support in Congress for a larger military role in Somalia, 
as I learned in a White House meeting with several members; most of them 
demanded an immediate withdrawal of our forces.  I strongly disagreed, and in 
the end we compromised on a six-month transition period.  I didn‟t mind taking 
Congress on, but I had to consider the consequences of any action that could 
make it harder to get congressional support for sending American troops to 
Bosnia and Haiti, where we had far greater interests at stake.” (Clinton, 2004, p. 
552) 
 
Clinton did accede to Congressional demands to withdraw from Somalia, but he did so to 
protect the other priorities of his administration.  The Somalia intervention was not a 
priority for the Clinton administration and consequently did not receive the attention and 
analysis that a military operation of that size demands.  Ultimately, this inattention 
derailed the Somalia policy, not Congressional advocacy.  Congressional advocacy only 
functioned as an intervening variable during the crisis, filling the void of executive 
leadership left in the wake of the presidential transition.   
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CONCLUSION 
Despite several attempts throughout the post-war period to smooth the transition 
process with policy and legislation, events during the Somalia intervention are strikingly 
parallel to those of the Bay of Pigs crisis thirty years earlier.  Both policy miscalculations 
were driven by the same transitional limitations: ambiguity, the holdover effect, and 
inexperience.  In both crises, transitional ambiguity prevented adequate oversight as the 
outgoing administration deferred decisions to an incoming administration that was 
unwilling to take ownership.  During the Bay of Pigs crisis, transitional ambiguity 
allowed an ill-conceived plan to gain momentum despite a crippling lack of ownership or 
analysis.  Thirty years later, transitional ambiguity allowed the Bush administration to 
launch an extensive military operation with only a few months remaining in office by 
deferring consideration of long-term consequences to the next administration.  Each crisis 
also demonstrated the struggle of new administrations to deal with policies and personnel 
held over from the previous administration.  For the Kennedy team, the holdover effect 
generated two diametrically opposed influences on the planning process: internal 
reluctance to take ownership of the plan and external political pressure to embrace the 
operation.  The holdover effect also shifted the role of CIA planners from analysts to 
advocates, as they were placed in the position of defending the previous administration‟s 
actions.  For the Clinton administration, the holdover effect resulted in an ongoing 
military operation that was incompatible with the priorities of the new administration.  In 
both cases, the holdover effect severely limited critical analysis of a major military 
operation.  Finally, each crisis revealed the danger that inexperience poses to new 
administrations.  Both the Kennedy and Clinton administrations struggled to formulate 
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effective policy decisions while learning to work with each other and within the 
governmental bureaucracy.  The Bay of Pigs operation and the Somalia intervention also 
suffered from ad-hoc decision-making processes that had not yet been tested during a 
crisis. 
The limitations imposed by the transition period diverted presidential leadership 
and attention from major military operations.  In the absence of executive leadership, 
other forces dominated the decision-making process.  During the Bay of Pigs crisis, 
members of the Kennedy administration unconsciously merged their arguments to a 
shared set of beliefs and norms in a process that Irving Janis identified as groupthink.  
During the Somalia intervention, congressional advocacy exerted undue influence on the 
presidential decision-making process.  Bureaucratic politics played a role in both crises.  
In the absence of strong presidential leadership and direction, policies were derailed by 
bureaucratic maneuvering and infighting.  The Transitional Limitations Model illustrates 
how transitional limitations allowed all of these forces to temporarily replace presidential 
leadership and derail American foreign policy.  These parallels demonstrate the continued 
threat of the transition period to the direction and implementation of American foreign 
policy.       
This thesis fills a void in the existing literature on presidential decision-making in 
American foreign policy.  Foreign policy during American presidential transitions 
remains a neglected area of the field.  Many existing analyses address foreign policy 
crises that occurred during a presidential transition, but they overlook the obvious role of 
the transition period itself.  Instead, these sources focus on other causes including 
bureaucratic politics, groupthink, and the role of Congress.  These factors play an 
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important role in the transitional foreign policy crises discussed in this thesis, but their 
influence on presidential decision-making raises an important question that is not 
addressed by existing analyses.  Why are these factors allowed to dominate presidential 
decision-making?  The Transitional Limitations Model introduced in this thesis answers 
that question.  During the Bay of Pigs crisis and the Somalia intervention, factors such as 
groupthink, Congressional advocacy, and bureaucratic politics serve as intervening 
variables that magnify the crippling impact of transitional limitations on presidential 
power.         
This paper should not be interpreted as an argument against the American 
democratic system.  Transitional limitations are the unavoidable cost of the democratic 
process.  However, this cost is accompanied by the benefits of legitimacy, flexibility, and 
new ideas.  The case studies in this paper demonstrate not only the weaknesses of 
American democracy, but also the strengths.  Transitional crises present invaluable and 
irreplaceable lessons for new administrations.  Both the Kennedy and Clinton 
administrations emerged from the crises with stronger decision-making procedures and a 
broader realization of the demands and limitations of the presidency.  Immediately after 
the crisis, Kennedy remarked, “We got a big kick in the leg – and we deserved it.  But 
maybe we‟ll learn something from it” (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 290).  In his memoirs, 
Clinton similarly discussed the Somalia crisis as a learning experience for his 
administration:  
“After Black Hawk Down, whenever I approved the deployment of forces, I knew 
much more about what the risks were, and made much clearer what operations 
had to be approved in Washington.  The lessons of Somalia were not lost on the 
military planners who plotted our course in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and 
other trouble spots of the post-Cold War world…”  (Clinton, 2004, p. 554) 
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The flexibility of the American democratic system provided both the Kennedy and 
Clinton administrations with the opportunity to learn from their early mistakes.  
Additionally, the inherent accountability of a democratic system gave each administration 
added incentive to pursue those opportunities.  These are just a few of the benefits that far 
outweigh the transitional limitations discussed in this thesis.  The presidential transition 
period will remain an unavoidable threat to the cohesion of American foreign policy.  
Future administrations must recognize this vulnerability not as a weakness that can be 
overcome, but as a learning process that is inherent to the American democratic system.     
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